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Abstract
This Independent Study is divided into four chapters. The first chapter examines
the role of capitalism in the formation of our culture. The argument presented here is that
culture plays an important role in reinforcing modern neoliberal capitalism and that
neoliberal capitalism has massive control over the dissemination of culture and the arts.
The chapter concludes that it is necessary to utilize socio-cultural means in combating the
influence of capitalism, and there does indeed exist emancipatory potential in artistic
political praxis.
The second chapter focuses on Theodor Adorno’s aesthetic theory in articulating
his conception of the emancipatory potential of art. This chapter explicates on Adorno’s
idea of a sovereign and autonomous artistic praxis and looks at his objections to the
politicization of art. Finally, the chapter looks at what Adorno considers legitimate
artistic political praxis and attempts at an understanding of Adorno’s concept of aesthetic
negativity in relation to artistic political praxis.
The third chapter focuses on the political theory of Chantal Mouffe; specifically,
it is an explication of her theory of agonistics as a democratic political praxis. The
chapter will explore Mouffe’s concept of hegemony in relation to how she conceives of
agonistics. It will also explain how Mouffe understands public spaces as battlegrounds
for agonistic struggle. The fourth chapter focuses on how Mouffe conceives of the role of
art in agonistic political praxis.
The fourth and final chapter of this study evaluates the two different conceptions
of artistic political praxis presented by Adorno and Mouffe on their respective merits and
deficiencies. It will attempt to adjudicate the differences between the respective theories
and try to formulate some kind of practical frame for how artistic political praxis ought to
be conducted.
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Chapter I: The Culture Industry
Introduction
In this project, I wish to answer the question, what is the role of art or artistic
practices in political resistance against neoliberal capitalism. To do this, I engage with the
works of theorists Theodor Adorno and Chantal Mouffe, both of whom wrote about the
role that art could play in politics. Both Adorno and Mouffe are concerned with the
mechanisms of systems of domination and the ways in which we can resist and subvert
them. However, they come to widely divergent prescriptions on how to engage in artistic
political praxis. To understand their place for art in political praxis, we must first
understand how they saw the cultural and social landscape in which art was operating as
well as the forces that act upon artistic enterprise.
To do this, I will engage with the concept of the culture industry that is utilized by
both Adorno and Mouffe in their works. Adorno and Max Horkheimer first articulated
the culture industry in the essay “The Culture Industry,” which is an evaluation of the
role that culture plays in reinforcing modern neoliberal capitalism (Adorno and
Horkheimer 2002). In their essay, Adorno and Horkheimer develop the idea of the culture
industry, which is supposed to be the seemingly monolithic view of culture’s place in
modern neoliberal capitalism. While Marxists before them were concerned with the
economic dimensions of capitalism, Horkheimer and Adorno use this essay to show us
the socio-cultural and political features of capitalism. Then, I will touch on Chantal
Mouffe’s conception of a post-Fordist culture industry and examine what that means for
artistic praxis.
In this chapter, I will examine the account of the culture industry and consider the
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implications of this perspective on culture for artistic political praxis. Both Adorno and
Mouffe ultimately believe that, despite the power of the culture industry in shaping
individuals and in controlling the arts, art has emancipatory potential that can be
harnessed to liberate us in some way. In the rest of this thesis, I will examine the place for
art in political praxis as outlined by Adorno and Mouffe and what aesthetic resistance
should look like for them. In the concluding chapter of this thesis, I will evaluate their
respective theories with regard to how capitalism operates today and see which of their
theories is better suited to a theory of artistic political praxis that can resist against
neoliberal capitalism as we know it today.

What is the Culture Industry?
Adorno and Horkheimer’s essay on the culture industry can be read as a response
to the Marxists of their time who suggested a linear progression to history that would lead
inevitably to communism. According to Karl Marx, the end point of capitalism is its
eventual and inevitable replacement by full communism. The focus of his analysis was
primarily the economic structures that governed capitalism, and once those economic
powers collapsed due to their unsustainability, we would eventually achieve the full
communist state. For Marx, the progression of history was clearly linear and the
progression of his materialist dialectic pointed eventually to a classless communist
society. One of many criticisms that are levied against Marx is addressed briefly by
Adorno and Horkheimer in their essay “The Culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass
Deception” (Adorno and Horkheimer 2002). Adorno and Horkheimer believe that Marx
underestimated the power of cultural forces in the political sphere, and Marx's claim that
history would lead us inevitably to communism was impossible because of the pervasive
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influence of capitalism on our culture.
Marx was an economic determinist who believed that all social and political
relationships are built on economic ones.1 His idea is that we can change our current
social and cultural realities by changing our economic realities; though the influence of
capitalism impacts the social and cultural realms, the only real way to change anything is
by changing economic realities. Adorno and Horkheimer disagree with Marx on this.
According to them, the ways for us to change capitalism are not limited to the economic
spheres or the market like Marx postulated. Rather, capitalist commodification pervades
our culture and our lives in ways that are not immediately apparent, and consequently our
methods for combatting capitalism cannot be limited to the economics of it. Marxist
analysis holds that a redistribution of the forces of production can overthrow capitalism
and lead to the communist revolution; Adorno and Horkheimer suggest that
commodification and capitalism are so pervasive in so many aspects of our lives that
simply changing the immediate economic reality may not be enough to change the reality
of capitalism (Adorno and Horkheimer 2002, 94). Similarly, Marx also believed that
capitalism had an influence on the way culture is structured. However, Marx was fixated
on finding a solution to the problem of capitalist commodification through economic
means, and did not see the potential for change through culture itself. If we think about
this in terms of Marx’s base and superstructure model, art and culture act as part of the
superstructure, reflecting the economic relationships and ideology, and maintaining and
shaping the means and relations of production, while being dominated by the base

1

Economic determinism is the theory that social and political relationships are built on economic ones.
See: Marx and Engel’s The German Ideology.
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structure.2 The thought here is that if we change the base structure, then everything else
will change as well, and that is why Marx focused on economic relationships.
Adorno and Horkheimer’s disagreement with Marx lies in the thought that Marx
understated the influence of art and culture on capitalism; they believe that Marx did not
understand the staying power of capitalism because he underestimated the extent to
which art and other aspects of the superstructure really function to stabilize capitalist
society. This is because capitalism is concerned not just with control of the marketplace
but also the creation and control of mass culture. The Fordism and technological
reproducibility of capitalism seeps into our culture and results in a culture under
capitalism that is uniform and mass produced, much like any other manufactured good.
Regarding the uniformity of mass culture as we experience it today, Adorno and
Horkheimer write: “All mass culture under monopoly is identical, and the contours of its
skeleton, the conceptual armature fabricated by monopoly, are beginning to stand out”
(Adorno and Horkheimer 2002, 95). Marx failed to understand how commodification and
capitalism operated on the cultural level, and that is where Adorno and Horkheimer's
critique becomes apparent. The inevitable progression of history that Marx saw was not
quite so inevitable to Adorno and Horkheimer, who wrote, “In reality, a cycle of
manipulation and retroactive need is unifying the system ever more tightly … Any need
which might escape the central control is repressed by that of individual consciousness”
(Adorno and Horkheimer 2002, 95). Their argument against Marx is that capitalism,
through the culture industry, has subjugated our consciousnesses through standardized
and technologically centralized media. As a result, the individual becomes the democratic

2

The base structure is the economic and material reality and the superstructure is the ideology that upholds
this reality.
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consumer, and the consumer does not want to resist capitalism because capitalism has
created the consumer. Adorno and Horkheimer believe, however, that because the
influence of art and culture on capitalism is actually greater than Marx was willing to
admit, influencing capitalism through changing the superstructure through changing
culture may in fact be a viable way of weakening the base structure of capitalist
production. Thus, if we can achieve liberation from cultural commodification, then we
can effectively combat capitalist production. So, the culture industry is the invasion of
capitalism into the production and dissemination of art and culture.

Needs under Capitalism
Modern capitalism no longer limits itself to the market; rather it pervades our
culture and our lives through standardization and commodification of art and other
artifacts of culture. Adorno and Horkheimer point out that modern culture is
characterized by a standardization of production with “few production centers and widely
dispersed reception [of goods produced]” (Adorno and Horkheimer 2002, 95). With such
a system, there can be production of cultural goods that provides for essentially
everyone's apparent needs – “Something is provided for everyone so that no one can
escape” (Adorno and Horkheimer 2002, 97). Production is clearly marked, and the
differences between the individual manufactured cultural goods are also clearly marked,
but ultimately completely artificial. That is to say, the goods that are manufactured have
surface diversity, and may in fact be produced in seemingly different ways, but in the end
are essentially the same thing – for example, our having to choose between Netflix and
Hulu and Amazon Instant Video and HBOGo makes it seem as if there is diversity and
we have a choice, but upon further examination, these services are not so different after
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all.
One thought is that there are needs that are generated by capitalism, and capitalist
commodification depends on the satisfaction of these kinds of needs.3 According to
Espen Hammer, the culture industry is geared towards maximization of profit and is
dependent on generating new demands that must be satisfied (Hammer 2005, 82). One
may ask, if capitalism is satisfying our desires successfully, then why is it a problem and
why should we balk against it? The problem is that capitalism does not in fact satisfy our
genuine desires – rather, it substitutes our desires with something that is close, but
ultimately unsatisfactory. For example, the culture industry may appear to satiate our
need for intellectually engaging art that offers genuine critique by substituting it with a
piece that gestures at critique while still falling entirely into the trappings of capitalism.
The satisfaction of needs under capitalism is unsatisfactory and the choices that are
offered to us by capitalism are artificial.
One good example of this is given by Edward Bernays, who is widely considered
the father of modern public relations and advertising. Bernays, in his 1929 book
Propaganda, wrote, “Those who manipulate this unseen mechanism of society constitute
an invisible government which is the true ruling power of our country … We are
governed, our minds are molded, our tastes formed, our ideas suggested, largely by men
we have never heard of” (Bernays 2004, 9-10). This passage suggests that our tastes and
opinions are formed under a commodified society through the creation of artificial desires
and needs in us that we did not previously have.
Espen Hammer’s analysis goes beyond the artificiality of the choices offered by
capitalism; he goes further and suggests that even the needs which we have and that may
3
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appear ‘natural’ are mediated by society. According to Hammer, there are no such things
as ‘natural needs,’ and any distinction between surface-level needs that are created by the
culture industry and our apparent deep, natural needs, like hunger and thirst, is arbitrary
(Hammer 2005, 82). The thought here is that even our most fundamental needs like
hunger and thirst are mediated by cultural expectations of what is tasty or healthy, or
which foods are good to eat and which are not. Hammer writes: “Man, as it were, is
nature all the way up and interpretation all the way down” (Hammer 2005, 82). We may
have needs, which arise naturally, but the ways we satisfy such needs is open to
interpretation, and can be and are influenced by the culture industry. That is, natural
needs are indeterminate and are shaped by our own self-interpretation of how to fulfill
them. We may be hungry, for example, but how we must satisfy that hunger is
determined by our interpretations, which are mediated by a system of exchange (in the
case of the culture industry, a capitalist system of exchange). The needs that are
generated and satisfied by the culture industry are also ‘false’ in a sense because they
arise out of a system that aims at profit rather than the happiness and integrity of its
members.
An example of this need creation is the idea that American women ought to
remove body hair. Christine Hope, in her article “Caucasian Female Body Hair and
American Culture,” outlined the history of shaving for women in the United States.
Before 1915, the removal of women’s body hair was not a need that existed in American
popular culture. According to Hope, the call for the removal of unsightly body hair on
women began with the publication of an article in Harper’s Bazaar in 1915, which
featured a woman wearing a sleeveless dress, with her arms, raised, “revealing perfectly
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clear armpits” (Hope 1982, 93). Before this campaign, the need for clean-shaven
underarms did not exist – the term ‘underarm’ did not even exist. This is an example of a
need created by the culture industry that it satisfies. The only apparent way to remove
ourselves from this system of need satisfaction is, according to Hammer and Adorno,
through enlightening ourselves through an endless process of critique and negation
(Hammer 2005, 82).
Adorno and Horkheimer think that in the culture industry, the consumer's choice
exists only in choosing what cultural product to consume. So capitalism standardizes and
commodifies culture, makes uniform the forces of production, and then takes away the
choice of the individual on whether or not to consume said culture. The standardization
and commodification of culture has political implications, as the decisions we make
about whether to consume, or what it is that we should consume, is done by the
dissemination of information onto the public. The point that Adorno and Horkheimer
wish to emphasize here is that the direct result of this standardization of culture is that
citizens are manipulated into being passive consumers that do not engage meaningfully or
actively in the political process (Adorno and Horkheimer 2002, 98). The culture industry,
with its power to trap consumers in its cycle of consumption, turns individuals and
potential political challengers into mere consumers. That is to say, individuals become
disinterested in and distracted from genuine political processes when faced with the cycle
of capitalist consumption. Hammer offers a historical explanation for the staying power
of commodification by attributing modern Western capitalism to the economic changes
that occurred in the 1950s and 1960s that were a direct result of the fiscal policies of the
New Deal (Hammer 2005, 82). These policies made it possible for diverse groups to
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participate in mass consumption. Without the mass participation of the public, the
centralization of capital and the emphasis on technological change as we see with modern
capitalism today would not be possible. It seems that, to those entrapped in the policies
resultant from the New Deal, the systemic imperatives of mass consumption were
irresistible and modern capitalism became bound up in the culture industry. Hammer’s
line of thinking seems to suggest that, because of particular historical forces, we could
not have possibly resisted the creation and proliferation of the culture industry. The
creation of needs that were a result of the economic changes has become cemented in
Western neoliberal culture.

Production of Art in the Culture Industry
Art created by the culture industry becomes tools that serve to subjugate members
of society and turn us all into passive ‘democratic’ consumers. The production process,
however, may not have necessarily intentionally been formulated as a tool of subjugation.
The reason capitalist modes of production are compelling is that they are cheaper, easier,
and less risky to produce. Popular culture is cheap, easy, and relatively low-risk to
produce, and the art created is uniform, save for negligible variance in detail that gives
the consumers an illusion of choice.4 Adorno and Horkheimer give a good example of
this kind of production:
Not only do hit songs, stars, and soap operas conform to types
recurring cyclically as rigid invariants, but the specific content of
productions, the seemingly variable element, is itself derived from
4

By low-risk, I mean that their cost of production is low and the chances for failure of a product produced
through this method is low. A film that is produced to follow a well-known and successful formula is much
lower risk than an experimental film that uses a novel idea. Take Terry Gilliam’s film The Adventures of
Baron Munchausen, which was critically acclaimed because of its novelty and ingenuity but flopped in the
box office because it was too unusual – that film was a risk to produce, and its commercial failure reflected
that.
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those types. The details become interchangeable. (Adorno and
Horkheimer 2002, 98)
Basically, the variations that we see in hit music, films, and art, conform to some kind of
set model. The details of one popular pulp fiction novel are interchangeable with another
that falls under the same genre, where the only real differences are miniscule. One
example of this is the use of tropes in popular media, which are, according to the TV
Tropes website, “devices and conventions that a writer can reasonably rely on as being
present in the audience members’ minds and expectations” (TV Tropes).5 Tropes are
ideas or characters that are recycled from one story to the next, which allow for easy
creation of media with essentially interchangeable parts.
Adorno and Horkheimer believe that this type of production of mass culture
results in a number of things; first, there is a decline in the real variety and quality of
cultural goods when they are produced by the culture industry; second, the new
techniques of production and standardization have produced media simply to serve
capitalism; and finally, the primacy of the illusion of choice over actual content in mass
media has removed the critical power of art. The decline in quality for cultural goods can
be seen in this passage: “The culture industry has developed in conjunction with the
predominance of effect, the tangible performance, the technical detail, over the work
which once carried the idea and was liquidated with it” (Adorno and Horkheimer 2002,
99). This passage suggests that the emphasis on flair or style over form or content has led
to the creation of inferior cultural goods. Cultural goods are created with a preference for
effect over the content, and this subsequently leads to a lack of variety in content and
form in the culture that we consume. The lack of variety in content and form is a result of
5

See website: http://www.tvtropes.org
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the new techniques of production championed by capitalism, and the resultant techniques
of production and standardization in media result in art being created simply as
reflections of capitalist modes of production. Another result is that the homogeneity of
pop culture turns art into a tool for capitalist domination. The production of new effect
while maintaining the old schema “merely increases the power of the tradition which the
individual effect seeks to escape” (Adorno and Horkheimer 2002, 101). The culture
industry allows for variation in effect and style insofar as it falls within an acceptable
range – anything that falls outside it is purged from mainstream popular culture and
forgotten, and anything that isn’t purged is co-opted into perpetuating the consumerism
of the culture industry. The culture industry, besides lacking substance, co-opts anything
novel and purges the market of anything critical.

The Culture Industry's Preoccupation with Style
Though the culture industry may appear monolithic and insurmountable, for
Adorno there still exists emancipatory potential in art. Though it may appear that Adorno
and Horkheimer’s readings are pessimistic, I think they do believe that, under the right
conditions, art can open us up to new possibilities. The way this point is expressed in
their writing is through comparing the strategic artistic use of style between ‘great’ artists
and what Adorno and Horkheimer saw as modern art. Specifically, they argue that great
artists were willing to push the envelope when it came to style, and modern art suffers
from the trappings of style. Adorno and Horkheimer write: “The great artists were never
those whose works embodied style in its least fractured, most perfect form but those who
adopted style as a rigor to set against the chaotic expression of suffering, as a negative
truth” (Adorno and Horkheimer 2002, 103). Great artists were not afraid to subvert style,
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and some even expressed a mistrust of it. In contrast, according to Adorno and
Horkheimer, modern art suffers from an “untruth of style … in being absorbed through
style into the dominant form of universality” (Adorno and Horkheimer 2002, 103). The
mass production of uniform products that is necessary for capitalist production and style
because it is the adherence to a particular form, which is easy to recreate or imitate,
becomes important in capitalist production. That is, modern art, because it adheres
strictly to style as is required in capitalist production, simply reflects the dominant
universal paradigm.
Modern art, because of its emphasis on flair or style over meaningful content,
lacks a tension between content and style, which is necessary for emancipatory art,
according to Adorno and Horkheimer. Their observation about art in modern capitalist
society is that it lacks critical power due to it lacking the necessary tension between
content and style. That is, the content of modern capitalist art is not challenged by the
styles that are used to express them, and vice versa. This relationship is similar to what
Adorno wrote about in his Negative Dialectics concerning the origin of critical power
(Adorno 1981). Modern art fails at critique and negation because it adheres strictly to
style, is a product of a capitalist system which aims at profit rather than human
flourishing, and instead of allowing for us to explore genuine human needs, obfuscates
them along with any real expression of suffering. For art to be critical, it must be truthful,
and sometimes the truth involves the expression of human suffering and the culture
industry does not allow for this. Style is, according to Adorno and Horkheimer, the
record of tradition, and must thus be confronted in some way in order for art to express
human suffering. The culture industry creates a uniform style and does not allow for the
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deviation in style necessary for radical art or for the expression of suffering.
Adorno and Horkheimer believe that existing modes of style must be challenged
fundamentally in order for art to have critical value. This challenge to style does not
result in harmony or unity between content and form – great works of art, for example,
fail to conform to style and are happy to fail at producing a uniform style. In other words,
great artists dare to defy style, while modern art works are inferior in that they conform
rigidly to style necessarily for them to achieve an audience in modern capitalist society.
The lesson to take away from this is that radical art ought to have radical form; that is,
part of the emancipatory potential lies in its ability to defy form and style. That is to say,
being able to defy style is an aspect of artistic political praxis and not the totality of it –
stylistic variance is a necessary but not sufficient condition for critical artistic practice.
The importance of stylistic variance lies in the thought that the delivery of
seemingly radical messages through a standardized form is a weapon of capitalism – such
practice does not allow for us to be critically reflective of or critically engage in the
messages behind these works when their delivery in form and content is so uniform. The
seeming plurality that we see in content still conform to rigid styles – there seems on the
surface to be a plurality of views and ideas but only the ones that conform to the rigid
lines drawn in the sand by the culture industry survive. Adorno and Horkheimer wrote:
“Anyone who resists can survive only by being incorporated. Once registered as
diverging from the culture industry, they belong to it as the land reformer belongs to
capitalism” (Adorno and Horkheimer 2002, 104). It seems here that Adorno and
Horkheimer are suggesting that the artworks or works of art mainstream artists produce
within the culture industry are controlled by the institutions and processes of the culture
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industry, which determine what is or isn't art (Sharma 2006, 2).
This looks very much like a closed and cynical view of the function of the cultural
industry, almost a hopeless one, where deviation from the norm is tolerably only insofar
as it fits somehow into the prevailing style or narrative – as soon as a work deviates too
far from the permitted styles, it is squashed and forgotten. With such a reading, it does
not seem possible to resurrect art's emancipatory potential because it is almost entirely
beholden to the efficient production methods instituted by capitalism. I disagree with this
pessimistic reading of this essay and would argue that the authors did in fact allow for art
to achieve its emancipatory potential. The influence and extent of the culture industry is
indeed pervasive, but it does not extend to all aspects of culture. In other words, the
culture industry does not encompass all culture, only popular Western, neoliberal
capitalist culture. There are ways to see outside of our social reality, and emancipation
from the culture industry is possible. As such, the art that is created outside of the
capitalism, or art created within it that critically engages in style and form, may indeed
have emancipatory potential if it is not dismissed as merely amusement.

Art as Amusement
When we read the authors’ treatment of the culture industry as limited specifically
to modern Western neoliberal capitalism, we can evaluate how art is used to reinforce
that system. One critique that Adorno and Horkheimer articulated is that art is valued for
its instrumental use value as a source of amusement. Art that is created today is done so
with the goals of entertainment and distraction in mind. Espen Hammer offers a good
evaluation of art's use value in his book Adorno and the Political:
The culture industry is corrupt not only because it prevents cultural items

15
from actualizing their use-value but because, in doing so, it exploits
people's genuine desires in order to profit from products that, rather than
satisfying those desires, reconfigure them and offer substitute forms of
gratification. (Hammer 2005, 78)
The entertainment and distraction provided by the products of the culture industry do not
even satisfy the genuine desires and needs of the consumer; rather, the desires are
reconfigured and repackaged and averted.
One of Edward Bernays’ most successful public relations campaigns was to
promote the Lucky Strikes brand of cigarettes to women, and it made cigarette-smoking
fashionable amongst women at the time. He had a group of young models march through
New York City and called photographers and journalists to tell them that women were
marching through the city to light “torches of freedom.” Upon the arrival of the press, the
women lit the Lucky Strikes cigarettes in front of the journalists and photographers, and
the New York Times (1 April 1929) printed the story, “Group of Girls Puff at Cigarettes
as a Gesture of Freedom.” The commodified smoking of cigarettes became equated with
the women’s rights movement, and as women’s rights became more widely accepted, so
did the smoking of cigarettes for women. Bernays’ move can be seen as a successful
subversion or redirection of the desire for women’s rights into the purchase of
commodified goods.6
The work of popular art in the culture industry is that of amusement, pacification,
and repression. The perniciousness of popular art goes even deeper than simply that,
though. Despite the base and unfulfilling nature of popular art, it still suggests at or hints
at some higher gratification or even negation that cannot actually occur. “The culture
industry is corrupt,” write Adorno and Horkheimer, “not as a sink of iniquity but as the
6

Adam Curtis’ documentary, The Century of the Self, characterizes this campaign pretty well.

16
cathedral of higher gratification” (Adorno and Horkheimer 2002, 114). That is, pure
amusement for its own sake cannot be permitted in the culture industry because it is
considered “naive” – the entertainment of the culture industry must scoff at unbridled
amusement and hint at something higher. The culture industry promotes some kind of
'elevated' amusement that hints at negation or critique but does not actually allow for it.
Here, it seems that the culture industry reduces the role of art to that of simple
amusement and gratification, yet it perversely makes it so that we cannot enjoy art simply
as amusement. Popular art’s attempt to present itself as ‘higher gratification’ makes it so
that it not only does not satisfy our need for amusement but also diverts our need for a
critical culture.
The result of this reaching for elevated meaning in popular art is the elevation of
amusement itself, above all other values, as the ideal to strive towards in the culture
industry. Art’s value becomes equated with the amusement, and subsequent pacification,
that it can provide. Art’s value is reduced two functions: amusement, and catharsis.7 The
thought is that art’s value in the culture industry is in its value as something that mitigates
our desire for critique. This is also how amusement becomes a means by which the
culture industry can control the masses – art acts as a cathartic release for our emotions
and our experiences of suffering, or source of vulgar amusement to distract and pacify the
consumers. An example of art’s place in catharsis and pacification exists in how Aristotle
characterized his tragedies. For Aristotle, the tragedy was supposed to allow us to
experience intense emotion in the controlled atmosphere of the theater so that the
populace could resume their lives as good citizens and members of the polus. Aristotelian

7

Dramatic catharsis is “a therapeutic purgation, relieving oppressive emotions by arousing and expelling
them” (Aristotle 1997, 11).
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tragedy was not supposed to make us feel out of place but was supposed to affirm the
citizens’ place in society.
Furthermore, art that is created as amusement, instead of showing us possibilities
beyond our mundane reality, becomes identical and identified with reality. The art that is
created through the culture industry reinforces the existing capitalist paradigm by
depicting our realities as natural and unquestionable. The argument is that the cultural
products that are presented to us through the culture industry unreflectively reflect the
reality in which we live thus preventing any kind of critical analysis. That popular art that
is created is pacifying and provides relief from the stresses of modern capitalist life
without offering any kind of reflection on the capitalist reality in which it exists. The
cathartic amusement entrenches the consumers into capitalism until they accept it as a
natural reality, and the consumer uniformly accepts the narrative of the dominant culture.

Uniformity of the Consumer
The result of the uniformity in the culture industry and its emphasis on
amusement is a uniform consumer. That is, contemporary popular culture becomes a tool
for domination when the choices of the consumers are confined by capitalist production.
These consumers become victims, blindly accepting the narrative of culture that is
offered to them. The relationship between popular culture and the consumer is not as onesided as the consumer being victimized totally by this pernicious system – rather, the
consumers become part of what perpetuates capitalist production through expecting and
even demanding uniformity in their cultural goods, rejecting media that does not fit into
the capitalist narrative. The producers of culture gladly comply with the consumers'
demand for uniformity, allowing both parties to achieve some kind of capitalist harmony
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in which the exploited are complicit in their own exploitation.
The most egregious result of the commodification and demystification of art, in
my opinion, are the effect that it has on creating individual consumers and the way it
affects individual consciousnesses. The critical potential that could have existed in an
auratic work of art is removed completely when a work of art becomes a reified
commodity through the process of commodification removing works of art from their
particular context. The removal of art from its context is achieved precisely through the
mechanical reproduction of art as outlined by Walter Benjamin in his essay “The Work of
Art in an Age of Mechanical Reproduction” (Benjamin 1969). The power of a work of
art, or what Benjamin would call its ‘aura,’ is removed through the process of mechanical
reproduction. Subsequently, commodified art renders the individual consumer's analysis
of art shallow. It weakens the consumer’s critical abilities by reducing the depth of a
potential consumer’s analysis of any given work of art purely to surface-level expressions
of ‘I like it’ or ‘I don't like it.’ The analysis of art is simplified through a standard cultural
form that the art takes.

The Untotality of the Culture Industry
There are a few reasons why Adorno and Horkheimer’s culture industry seems
unsatisfactory to its detractors, and I wish to explore them in this section. One thought
behind an objection to their characterization of modern Western capitalist culture is that it
simply does not match up with how culture actually exists today. In the essay, culture is
monolithic and monopolized. However, there is the thought that culture we experience
today is fragmented and dispersed, that does not exist a monolithic and centralized
production centers of culture like Adorno and Horkheimer believe there is – Sven
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Birkerts suggests in The Gutenberg Elegies that, as we move into a more sophisticated
multimedia age, knowledge and culture are becoming less and less centralized (Birkerts,
2006). Some believe that there is a fragmentation in meaning and a shattered faith in
existing institutions, which seems contradictory to how Adorno and Horkheimer seem to
want to characterize culture today. So the question is, is there really a monolithic culture
industry that centrally produces culture when the way we consume and produce culture in
the media age appears so dispersed?
An immediate response to this idea of fragmentation is simply that Adorno and
Horkheimer disagree and do not see our age as fragmented. Perhaps the culture industry
as we experience it today allows for a surface plurality, and there exist a large number of
cultural products being produced for consumption from various places, but there does not
exist any genuine plurality, or any real choice for the consumer. As fragmented as some
aspects of modern media culture seem, the centers of production are still few, with a
small number of multinational corporations controlling a large share of our cultural
goods. An example of this is the production and dissemination of popular music that has
remained and continues to be centralized through four big record companies.8 The
particular choices we are supposed to have are illusory, and as Espen Hammer writes:
Adorno’s claim makes explicit use of a Hegelian figure: it presupposes a
notion of totality, as well as the false reconciliation or identity between the
general (the system of cultural exchange or capitalism as such) and the
particular (the product and its consumption) within this (false) totality
(Hammer 2005, 75).
According to Adorno, this lack of genuine plurality is not just horizontal (where we

8

There do exist enclaves of independent record companies, but I think that were they to go head to head
with multinationals, it is most likely that they will lose. Multinationals still control a very sizeable portion
of the music market, and their control is sizeable enough that it does not appear that indie and underground
labels can topple their monopolies anytime soon.
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choose between near-identical pop hits), but also vertical – “the experience of someone
attending an opera tends to be no less commodified than that of the consumer of soapoperas on the television” (Hammer 2005, 76). Here, he is making the claim that
bourgeois art is no more valuable than popular art, and even at the level of ‘fine art,’ we
do not have the kind of plurality necessary for a truly fragmented culture. In popular
culture, there is no real difference between the consumption of what we call high and low
art. Consuming the music of the Three Tenors is no different than consuming the music
of the Backstreet Boys; even the venues in which they perform are the same. The point is
that both high and low art are regulated and disseminated by the culture industry, and the
production and consumption of each is no different from the other.
Though Adorno and Horkheimer paint the culture industry as daunting and
monolithic, and though it may appear as if there does not exist any hope for autonomy
under such a system, I think there exists room for autonomy under the culture industry,
and that the totality of the culture industry is not quite as total as it appears at first glance.
Espen Hammer writes: “For Adorno, the only real potential for autonomy – or rather
some form of semi-autonomy – arises with the figure of the intellectual, for whom theory
becomes a tool by which to maintain one's reflective distance from culture” (Hammer
2005, 81). Theory, then, is what allows us to retain our distance from the society in which
we exist, which under late capitalism is comprised of the culture industry. It seems like
he is saying, we can escape the culture industry so long as we allow room to explore
possibilities.

From Fordism to Post-Fordism
One of the criticisms of Adorno and Horkheimer’s characterization of the culture
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industry lies in the progression of the culture industry, and the influence of capital on it.
Chantal Mouffe, in her essay “Cultural Workers as Organic Intellectuals,” argues that
Adorno and Horkheimer’s analysis of the culture industry is limited. Their belief that the
capitalist mode of production has infiltrated culture does not allow them to see how the
industrialization of culture and cultural forces has now changed the way that production
is engaged in (Mouffe 2013b, 208). For Adorno and Horkheimer, the culture industry
developed when the Fordist mode of production managed to infiltrate the field of
culture.9 Mouffe writes: “They present this evolution as a further stage in the process of
commodification and of subjugation of society to the requisites of capitalist production”
(Mouffe 2013b, 208). Here, she is suggesting that Adorno and Horkheimer’s analysis
sees only how society is commodified and subjugated through this commodification, and
not how the culture industry itself has changed the modes of production Mouffe draws
her analysis on the work of Paolo Virno, who argues that the culture industry played an
important role in the move from Fordism to post-Fordism (Mouffe 2013b, 208).
There is something hopeful in the way that post-Fordist production is construed,
and though Adorno and Horkheimer may see a possibility for critique within the Fordist
view of the culture industry, Virno sees hope in the move from Fordism to post-Fordism.
According to Mouffe, while Adorno and Horkheimer viewed the existence of the
informal, unexpected, and unplanned spaces as remnants of the past, Virno sees such
spaces as anticipatory omens of a new future (Mouffe 2013b, 208). That is, with the
development of immaterial labor, such spaces have come to play an important role in
opening the way for new forms of social relations. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri
9

Fordism is the term Mouffe uses to describe the mode of production described by Adorno and
Horkheimer that is characterized by industrialized and standardized forms of mass production. It is named
after Henry Ford, who pioneered the assembly-line process.
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claim that the new social relations signify “the end of the disciplinary regime that was
exercised over bodies in enclosed spaces like school, factories and asylums” (Mouffe
2013b, 209). Instead, procedures of control are now linked to “the growth of networks,”
which permits more autonomous and independent forms of subjectivity (Mouffe 2013b,
209).
Mouffe suggests that this new form of relationship is not necessarily for the
better. In Adorno and Horkheimer’s vision of the culture industry, the precarisation of
identities and subjects is a result of some Fordist mode of production; in other words, the
culture industry is something that happened to us, and Adorno and Horkheimer’s
suggestions for solutions rely on achieving autonomy from the culture industry (Mouffe
2013b, 209). Virno and Mouffe, on the other hand, stress that because people under postFordism are not as passive as they were under Fordism, they have now become “active
actors of their own precarisation” (Mouffe 2013b, 209). This results in what Mouffe calls
a ‘communism of capital,’ where victims of the culture industry become participants and
the same forces that perpetuate it.
One aspect of Mouffe’s post-Fordism is that the people that live under it are not
passive and instead participate in and perpetuate it. If this is true, then we can see new
ways of resisting the culture industry that Adorno may not have considered. Because the
people under post-Fordism are agents that participate in the culture industry (instead of
being victims of the culture industry), they also comprise of the forces that create the
subjectivities that exist under the culture industry. That is, people under a post-Fordist
culture industry have the opportunity to remold their subjectivities, norms, and values.
The possibilities that can be created under post-Fordism are not just limited to a
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resistance of whatever forces that perpetuate the culture industry. Rather, those
participating

in

culture

can

actively

create

subjectivities

and

norms.
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Chapter II: Negative Aesthetics and Praxis
Benjamin and Adorno
This chapter of the thesis is an attempt to synthesize and evaluate the positive
political conceptions for art presented by Theodor Adorno throughout his writings.
Included are his works Negative Dialectics, Aesthetic Theory, his Dialectics of
Enlightenment (which he coauthored with Max Horkheimer), and his correspondences
with Walter Benjamin. At the conclusion of his and Horkheimer’s essay on the culture
industry, it seems as if radical social change in the Western world is nigh impossible.
Adorno saw revolutions and resistance movements of his time being miscarried and
mismanaged because of what he viewed as a mistaken priority of political action over
theoretical engagement (Hammer 2005, 98). The prioritization of praxis over theory is
reflected well in Marx’s Theses on Feuerbach in which he wrote, “The philosophers have
only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it” (Marx and Simon
1994, 101). Nevertheless, Adorno believed that a return to theory was not regressive –
indeed, the return to theory was supposed to serve a political purpose.
To understand Adorno’s conception of a positive political praxis, I will move first
through his correspondences with Walter Benjamin which transpired between 1928 and
1940, ending abruptly in Benjamin’s suicide while attempting to escape from the Nazis.
The correspondence that I concern myself with most is the one addressed to Benjamin
after his publication of the essay “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical
Reproduction,” with which Adorno took issue (Benjamin 1969). The reason I engage
with this correspondence is because Adorno’s objection to Benjamin’s conception of aura
serves as a good prompt for how Adorno engages with artistic praxis – Benjamin believes
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that art has political implications as well, but the conclusion that he comes to with respect
to how to engage with art is wildly different from Adorno’s. My hope is that the inclusion
of this discourse will allow me to better explain Adorno’s conception of autonomy, and
by extension shed light on Adorno’s aesthetic praxis.
Next, I will attempt to outline Adorno’s formulation of negative dialectics and
contrast it to the dialectical methods of Marx and Hegel that were influential at the time
through his book Negative Dialectics. Finally, I will lay out Adorno’s argument for the
importance and primacy of the autonomy and sovereignty of art in Aesthetic Theory and
tie it back to a concept of aesthetic negativity, which I believe is fundamental to
understanding how Adorno conceived of artistic political praxis.
Benjamin on Aura
Adorno’s letters to Benjamin were in response to Benjamin’s publication of his
essay “The Work of Art in an Age of Mechanical Reproduction.” Espen Hammer
suggests that we read Adorno’s letters as an immanent critique of Benjamin’s work, as
they take Benjamin’s concepts and attempt to critique his overall work with his concepts
in mind. Adorno and Benjamin ultimately disagree about the significance or importance
of autonomy in particular works of art. For Adorno, the political potential of art lies in its
ability to remain autonomous and sovereign.10 Benjamin believes that under mechanical
reproduction, art can no longer be autonomous like Adorno wants it to be. For Benjamin,
when a work of art is valued for its uniqueness or authenticity, its value lies in its ritual

10

Benjamin does not believe such autonomy is possible. He writes: “When the age of mechanical
reproduction separated art from its basis in cult, the semblance of its autonomy disappeared forever”
(Benjamin 1969, 219).
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function. “This ritualistic basis,” Benjamin writes, “however remote, is still recognized as
secularized ritual” (Benjamin 1969, 224). To center the political value of art in its
autonomy or sovereignty would be wrong, because it is precisely the ritualization of art
and denying art’s sociality that Benjamin critiques with his essay. The new kinds of art
that are being created under mechanical reproduction, then, must rely on something other
than ritual. Adorno does not necessarily see mechanical reproduction as having escaped
the trappings of ritual, nor does he believe that escaping ritual is enough for art to achieve
its political potential. Whereas, for Benjamin, art’s reliance on ritual or ‘aura’ is
something that is holding it back from its full political potential, for Adorno, it is
precisely its ability to stand outside of society itself that art is able to serve any political
function. Espen Hammer suggests that Benjamin’s emphasis on art taking on a political
role is a response to the fascist aestheticization of politics – “This is the situation of
politics which fascism is rendering aesthetic. Communism responds by politicizing art”
(Hammer 2005, 122). Hammer believes that Benjamin is reducing art to its political
function in the same way that fascists attempt to aestheticize and ritualize the political.
Adorno touches on this when he talks about art’s political potential lies in its autonomy
and sovereignty.
In the essay “Work of Art,” Benjamin is trying to identify what it is that gives
works of art their unique quality, and he settles on a concept he calls ‘aura.’ Traditional
forms of art like painting, live music, or sculpture, are entirely unique and thus have an
unreproducibility about them that give them a cult quality (Benjamin 1969, 223).
Benjamin calls this quality “aura” and writes that it is “the unique phenomenon of a
distance, however close it may be” (Benjamin 1969, 222). Experiencing a work of art
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with aura requires one to be in its presence, and any attempt at reproduction fails to
replicate the aura of the original work. The object of art with aura is ineffable, distant,
and yet present at the same time. This is contrasted with an object that is infinitely
reproducible, like a photograph, where no original object to which we can attach cult
value exists. Benjamin attributes the nature of auratic art to the ritual practices that
sustain it, which guarantee the particular work’s authenticity and authority.11
Benjamin believes that a work of art can have aura if it is ritually sustained. This
is an interesting concept when applied to works that have been mechanically reproduced,
like an Andy Warhol print. An original Andy Warhol that sits in the MoMA in New York
is not qualitatively different than one you can purchase online, except the original’s cult
value and aura have been ritualistically maintained. Benjamin’s claim is that mechanical
reproduction makes it more difficult for artworks that are created through such means to
maintain their auratic nature through ritual practice. According to Benjamin, in an age of
mechanical reproduction, art loses its aura and cult value as a unique and privileged
entity: “For the first time in world history, mechanical reproduction emancipates the
work of art from its parasitical dependence on ritual” (Benjamin 1969, 224). When art’s
value is no longer based in ritual, it then must become based in something else.
According to Benjamin, the kinds of art that will allow for art to remove itself from aura
and ritual are the kinds that are mechanically reproducible, like film or photography.
Benjamin postulates that when the criterion of authenticity is no longer applicable to the
process of artistic production (due to mechanization of the production process), aura is no
longer the basis for the work’s value. “Instead of being based on ritual, it begins to be
based on another practice – politics” (Benjamin 1969, 224). Mechanically reproduced art
11

More on this, see Section 5 of Benjamin’s essay.
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takes on exhibition value instead of ritual value, and this is supposed to help art establish
its basis on the practice of politics.12 That is, because the production and reception of
mechanically produced art is collective rather than private, “this medium challenges the
predominantly private and solitary conditions for the production and reception of
bourgeois autonomous art, making it eminently suitable for the transmission of political
ideals in a mass society” (Hammer 2005, 125). Multiple hands may touch a piece of
bourgeois art and multiple people may play a role in the production of a piece of music,
but the production and reception are both limited to an elite class.
Mechanically reproduced art is created collectively and is not valued for its aura,
which bourgeois art is. This can potentially lead to the blurring of the divide between
‘high’ and ‘low’ art, making all art more accessible to the masses rather than a select
elite. The collective manpower required to create mechanically reproduced art also allows
art to be created more democratically rather than under the solitary conditions that are
employed for the creation of auratic art. Benjamin sees film as lacking the auratic aspect
of fine visual arts, allowing the audience to react differently to them. He writes:
“Mechanical reproduction of art changes the reaction of the masses toward art. The
reactionary attitude toward a Picasso painting changes into the progressive reaction
toward a Chaplin movie” (Benjamin 1969, 233). Benjamin believes that film, unlike
painting, has emancipatory potential because it allows for a sharper distinction between
the enjoyment and criticism of the art form. He does not think criticism is possible for
conventional art, which he thinks is “uncritically enjoyed” for its possession of aura
(Benjamin 1969, 233). Adorno’s response to Benjamin’s essay will allow us to
understand how it is that art’s political potential can lie in its autonomy and sovereignty.
12

Art on display for the masses has exhibition value.
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Aura and Autonomy
Adorno, on the other hand, disagrees with Benjamin’s conception of what
function aura serves. Where Benjamin sees the use of aura as something that
ritualistically reinforces the bourgeois elitism of high art, Adorno takes it in a slightly
different direction. Adorno accuses Benjamin of “flatly assigning to [aura] a
counterrevolutionary function” (Adorno et al. 2007, 121). Adorno writes:
The utmost consistency in the pursuit of the technical laws of autonomous
art changes this art and instead of rendering it into a taboo or fetish, brings
it close to the state of freedom, or something that can be consciously
produced and made. (Adorno et al. 2007, 122)
Adorno thinks that autonomous art can lead to some kind of emancipation, and
Benjamin’s rejection of it solely on the grounds of it having aura is wrong. Espen
Hammer attributes to Adorno the idea that aura is “a residue of non-intentional meaning,”
and can be either cultivated, through producing art, or exploited, through
commodification or advertising (Hammer 2005, 126). Adorno will argue that the
politicization of art does not actually help art serve its revolutionary function, and
politicizing art actually does the opposite of what it intends to do.
Adorno urges Benjamin to resist reducing art to its immediate political statements,
for he thinks that this will reduce its capacities for political judgment.13 To have an idea
of where Adorno is coming from, here is his prescription for Benjamin’s essay:
“Accordingly, what I would postulate is more dialectics” (Adorno et al. 2007, 124).

13

Adorno attributed he and Benjamin’s theoretical disagreements to the influence of the work of Bertolt
Brecht on Benjamin, whose emphasis on the political value of art had a big impact in how Benjamin
conceived of art. Adorno writes in one of his letters: “Indeed I feel that our theoretical disagreement is not
really a discord between us but rather, that it is my task to hold your arm steady until the sun of Brecht has
once more sunk into exotic waters” (Adorno et al. 2007, 126).
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Adorno believes that art is reduced in its capacities for judgment when its value is based
on the practice of politics as Benjamin says art under mechanical reproduction should be.
Adorno believes that some distance between art and the society that it exists in is
necessary for art to be critical. In Aesthetic Theory, Adorno writes:
Social struggles and the relations of classes are imprinted in the structure
of artworks; by contrast, the political positions deliberately adopted by
artworks are epiphenomena and usually impinge on the elaboration of
works and thus, ultimately, on their social truth content. Political opinions
count for little. (Adorno 1997, 232)
Artworks, because they are situated in history and are constructed by people in history,
carry in their structure hints or reflections of existing class relations and social struggles.
However, the artworks need not reflect particular political positions, for political ends do
not inhere in the artworks like social relations do, but rather are imposed upon works as
something external to them, and instead of creating more meaning, stand as obstacles to
our recognizing the reality of the works of art as situated in time. Hammer elaborates on
this point by saying that art, essentially, cannot address an audience directly without
being trapped by a logic of “false immediacy” (Hammer 2005, 126).
A main point of contention between Benjamin and Adorno was what Adorno
considered Benjamin’s overestimation of the emancipatory potential of what he thought
were non-auratic forms of art like film and photography. As discussed in the previous
chapter on the culture industry, Adorno and Horkheimer do not see film and photography
as forms of art that are free of the trappings of the bourgeois culture industry. Indeed,
their essay very correctly pointed out the fetishization and fetish character of film and
photography through what they call the “cult of stars” which is the phenomenon where
film stars and supermodels develop cult followings and become ritually worshipped in
popular culture and media. The culture industry essay can be considered an emphatic
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rejection of Benjamin’s insistence that mechanically reproduced art can be rid of aura and
become emancipatory simply by its technological reproducibility (Adorno et al. 2007,
123). In other words, changing the tools which we use to create art does not itself destroy
aura, for aura can be created in many different ways, and Adorno believes that Benjamin
is mistaken if he thinks changing production technique alone could bring about a higher
degree of political consciousness.14
If Benjamin’s rejection of aura rests on the fact that auratic art is accepted
uncritically (a point that Adorno will surely contest), then he is wrong in saying film does
not possess this uncritical reception. “The laughter of the audience at a cinema … is
anything but good and revolutionary; instead, it is full of the worst bourgeois sadism,”
Adorno writes (Adorno et al. 2007, 123). In fact, he argues that film possesses
unreflective aura to an extreme degree, and characterizes Chaplin’s work (which
Benjamin praises), as “out-and-out romanticization” (Adorno et al. 2007, 123). Adorno
argues that mechanically produced art has the same cult-like auratic qualities of
conventional forms of art, but exploits this quality for easy manipulation of the audience.
Adorno rejects the emancipatory potential of film on the grounds that the medium of film
is a passive one, in that when we watch films we are required to sit passively and receive
information. Film and photography are entirely passive mediums, which do not leave
room for participation and reflection; instead, they foster passivity in the consumer and
allow for authoritarian dictation. This is why they are good mediums for delivering
propaganda and political messages but also why Adorno believes that the claim that film
14

I do not think that Benjamin would think this, considering Nazi propaganda films existed at the time and
it was very clear that film could be used for auratic and authoritarian purposes. Adorno’s interpretation of
Benjamin here seems uncharitable.
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and photography would have emancipatory potential solely by being the medium that
they are is ludicrous. Adorno rejects the idea that some forms of art may be free from
aura simply because it is produced in a different way, and he also does not see how the
auratic quality that exists in a work can itself make a work unable to articulate critique.
He does not believe that autonomy alone renders a work of art into a taboo or fetish, and
writes: “… precisely the uttermost consistency in the pursuit of the technical laws of
autonomous art changes this art and … brings it close to the state of freedom, of
something that can be consciously produced and made” (Adorno et al. 2007, 122). Just
because film or photography have auratic qualities does not mean they cannot articulate
any critique. The problem Adorno has with them, as artistic mediums, are that they
appear to him to be comprised entirely of passive reception.
Another issue that Adorno has with Benjamin is one that is related to the
historical relevance of the essay to which he is responding. Benjamin’s essay was
supposed to be a response to the fascist aestheticization of the political, as reflected in
particular art movements like Futurism which massively influenced fascism.15 Espen
Hammer writes on how Adorno might be concerned with the communist politicization of
the aesthetic in response to fascism:
If fascism renders politics aesthetic by means of propagandist specularity
and communism renders the aesthetic political by means of socialistrealist rhetoric, then what is the deep and ultimate difference between
these two forms of cultural politics? In both cases, the artwork is
potentially reduced to a means for achieving a political end.” (Hammer
2005, 127)
This argument acts as a reason for Adorno to reject a politicization of the aesthetic, as
with art that engages in politics directly, there is no distinguishable difference between
15

Marinetti’s Futurist Manifesto is a work worth looking at for its role in the aestheticization of the
political.
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the form of political art and propaganda. Instead, Adorno argues that we should promote
and cultivate art’s distance from the society in which it exists. Adorno writes: “Only by
virtue of separation from empirical reality, which sanctions art to model the relation of
the whole and the part according to the works’ own need, does the artwork achieve a
heightened order of existence” (Adorno 1997, 6). This can be understood as a
preservation of the aura, but I am reluctant to interpret it that way; Adorno believes that
even art that is pointedly non-auratic is able to offer critique, and it is able to because of a
concept of autonomy. Adorno conceives of autonomy as entirely different from
Benjamin’s aura.16 Adorno believes that art’s autonomy lies in its purposelessness,
without “being for society” (Adorno 1997, 236). For Adorno, autonomous art is
inherently dialectical, and can transform aura from a fetish or taboo to an explication of a
state of freedom that can be consciously produced and made.
Espen Hammer points out that this concept of autonomy may seem contradictory
to the idea of the culture industry, as it does not seem like art can ever exist apart from its
social conditions, which, under capitalism, is characterized by a capitalist system of
exchange (Hammer 2005, 134). However, he argues that Adorno’s conception of
autonomy is not self-contradictory precisely because it does not take art as existing
outside of social structures. In fact, Adorno sees art as entirely a social fact. Adorno
writes: “Art’s double character – its autonomy and fait social – is expressed ever and
again in the palpable dependencies and conflicts between the two spheres” (Adorno 1997,
229). Here it seems that the dialectical nature of art is a result of the tension between the
autonomy of the work and the social realm that it occupies.

16

Adorno thought Schoenberg's music was non-auratic but autonomous and critical nonetheless.
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Negative Dialectics
In Negative Dialectics, Adorno distinguishes his own theory of dialectics from
that of Marx and Hegel. In his Lectures on Negative Dialectics, he writes “When I make
use of the term ‘dialectics’ I would ask you not to think of the famous triadic scheme of
thesis, antithesis, and synthesis in the usual sense, as you encounter it in the most
superficial account of school dialectics” (Adorno 2008, 6). Adorno implores us to discard
the ‘skeletal format’ of dialectics that has been extracted from Hegel’s dialectical model,
but rather to focus on what he believes is the inner structure of the dialectical method.
When the conceptual skeletal model of dialectics is discarded, what is left is the focus of
the dialectical method. The focus, for him, is rather on “the way in which … the concept
moves toward its opposite, the non-conceptual” (Adorno 2008, 6). Instead of the
dialectical tension existing between different concepts or between material objects,
Adorno sees the dialectical relationship in the tension between concepts and the objects
to which they refer. Negative dialectics is a concept of dialectics that is concerned with
contradiction – that is, the contradiction that exists in things themselves, contradiction in
the concept as well as contradiction between concepts. The contradiction lies in the
thought that any given concept is both more and less than the object to which it refers.
First, the idea that the concept is less than the object to which it refers is that the
concept necessarily enters into contradiction with the thing to which it refers in a way
that leaves it short. Adorno writes: “If I subsume a series of characteristics … under a
concept, what normally happens is that I abstract a particular characteristic from these
elements, one that they have in common: and this characteristic will then be the concept,
it will represent the unity of all the elements that possess this characteristic” (Adorno
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1997, 232). That is, the concept is less than the object to which it refers. When you call
an object ‘woman’ or ‘tree,’ you are necessarily referring to an aspect of the object, not
the object’s entirety. That is, “when B is defined as A, it is always also different from and
more than the A” (Adorno 2008, 7). When we speak of the status of an object as ‘free,’
we are similarly referring only to an aspect of the object.
Second, the concept is more than the characteristic objects that are subsumed
under it. Adorno explains it thusly: “If I think and speak of ‘freedom,’ this concept is not
simply the unity of the characteristics of all the individuals who can be defined as free on
the basis of a formal freedom within a given constitution” (Adorno 2008, 7). Here, we
see that freedom is above and beyond the particular states of the individuals who are
‘free.’ The contradictory nature of concept is that it is always simultaneously more and
less than the elements included in it. Similarly, when we refer to the concept ‘woman’ or
‘tree,’ the concept is above and beyond the particular women or particular trees that fall
under the category. That is, A=B, when A and B refer to concepts and the objects to
which they are applied, cannot be right because it implies that A and B are identical; A=B
is self-contradictory, however, because A and B are both somehow more and less than the
other.
When Adorno writes about art’s dialectical nature in Negative Dialectics and
Aesthetic Theory, he is concerned primarily with the contradiction in art. The concept of
contradiction is not concerned simply with the space between two objects, but rather with
the immanent contradiction in the object itself. I believe this is the key to understanding
how Adorno conceived of praxis. Adorno believes that contradiction is necessary for
dialectical thought, and we can see the contradiction in the structure of the concept and
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the relation of the concept to the thing it stands for. This contradiction can be used to
understand political praxis; a characteristic of Adorno’s political thought is that society is
necessarily antagonistic, and such an antagonism entails contradiction. He writes, “[An
antagonistic society] not a society with contradictions or despite its contradictions, but by
virtue of its contradictions” (Adorno 2008, 8-9).17 In the example of the culture industry,
“[The] profit motive which divides society and potentially tears it apart is also the factor
by means of which society reproduces its own existence” (Adorno 2008, 9).
Aesthetic Autonomy and Negativity
Adorno is wedded to the idea that the value of art lies not in its instrumental use
for some other cause, but that there is something in art that is valuable apart from its
instrumentalization, bearing in mind the tension caused by the instrumentalization on the
autonomy of the work. To understand his positive conception of artistic political praxis, I
turn to Adorno’s work in Negative Dialectics and Aesthetic Theory. Christoph Menke, in
his book The Sovereignty of Art, helps us understand the autonomy outlined in Adorno’s
work and elaborates on Adorno’s conception of aesthetic autonomy, which I will use in
this section of the chapter. According to Menke, Adorno’s art can be understood in terms
of its sovereignty and its autonomy (McCarthy and Menke 1999). The concept of
autonomy was introduced in the previous section, and in this section, I will offer an
elaboration on how it is used in Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory. For the purposes of this
project, I do not believe I need to elaborate on the epistemic sovereignty of art to
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Hegel believes that something affirmative could be discovered at the end of all negations, and Adorno
postulates the opposite, that there is something negative at the end of all positive relations.
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understand its place in political praxis.18 As such, I will not be utilizing this concept and
instead will focus on explaining Adorno’s concept of autonomy to understand his artistic
political praxis.
One reason for why art cannot be reduced to its political function is because it
gains its critical value in its autonomy. Menke characterizes Adorno’s autonomy of art as
an aesthetic phenomenon that adheres “to its own internal logic” and has its own space
alongside other spaces in the “pluralistic structure of modern reason” (McCarthy and
Menke 1999, vii). In Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory, for art to stand in a critical relationship
to the society that exists in, it must be autonomous. “Art’s asociality,” Adorno writes, “is
the determinate negation of a determinate society” (Adorno 1997, 226). Autonomous art
becomes a pure productive force that is freed from control and “keeps itself alive through
its social force of resistance” (Adorno 1997, 226). The autonomy in art lies in the fact
that nothing that is social about art is immediately social – even with art that attempts to
promote ideology, there is always some negation of whatever message is being conveyed
or whatever social order is being instituted. Menke points out that the negation that is
achieved through aesthetic experience is possible because aesthetic experience does not
hinge on any other forms of reason (like political reason) which cannot escape the
trappings of ideology (McCarthy and Menke 1999, viii). The distinctive internal logic of
aesthetic experience is demonstrated by how nonaesthetic experience takes place
alongside other discourses, allowing it to have a critical perspective to these other
experiences.
18

This concept is different from autonomy and is characterize by how aesthetic experience “does not take
its place within the differentiated structure of plural reason, but rather exceeds its bounds” (McCarthy and
Menke 1999, viii). Epistemic sovereignty is supposed to be the model that grants aesthetic experience
absolute validity, as it disrupts nonaesthetic discourses. I do not see this as a point that we need to address
to understand Adorno’s view on the place of art in politics.
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For Adorno, art’s autonomy as well as its critical value comes from its dialectical
nature. That is, art is critical when it is autonomous, and it is autonomous because it is
dialectical. “The distinctiveness, the uniqueness of art,” writes Menke, “is that it sets
itself apart, that it separates itself off” (McCarthy and Menke 1999, 3). Menke believes
that, for Adorno, the critical value of art lies in it being a completely different realm of
reason than other forms of reason, and in its distinctiveness and its being set apart from
everything else, it draws attention to the distinction between the aesthetic and the
nonaesthetic, or aesthetic difference.19 According to Menke, aesthetic difference, or the
distinction between the aesthetic and nonaesthetic, is aesthetic negativity (McCarthy and
Menke 1999, 3). Menke writes: “What art actually is, is contradiction, rejection,
negation” (McCarthy and Menke 1999, 3). Adorno believes that the aesthetic is
necessarily connected to the social, yet ought not be reduced to the social, for aesthetic
negativity is found in the contradiction within the social and autonomous nature of the
aesthetic. Adorno writes, “...art becomes social by its opposition to society, and it
occupies this position only as autonomous art” (Adorno 1997, 225). Here, it seems that
for art to have a critical function in society, it must stand in opposition to society. An art
that goes along with society loses its opportunity to play a critical social function. So the
autonomy of art, its ability to stand outside of society, allows for it to critique the society
that it exists in.
Christoph Menke identifies two misconceptions of Adorno’s aesthetic negativity
that need to be addressed. These misconceptions either reduce art to its social function
thereby neglecting its autonomy, or removing the social function from art altogether,
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Aesthetic experience is something that arises out of the space in which concepts are mapped onto
representative objects (McCarthy and Menke 1999, 18).
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turning the work of art into a fetish object. Adorno rejects these two misconceptions by
explicitly critiquing both the aestheticism that separates the aesthetic from the social, and
also the reduction of the aesthetic to the social (Adorno 1997, 226). Essentially, the
aesthetic is necessarily connected to the social, yet cannot be reduced to the social, and
both of the misconceptions try to either remove the aesthetic from the social or reducing
its function entirely to that of the social. The criticism of both positions can be
understood as “outlining the basic and necessary conditions of a concept of aesthetic
autonomy that any useful concept of aesthetic negativity must … satisfy” (McCarthy and
Menke 1999, 6). Both the misconceptions addressed by Menke take into account one
aspect of the aesthetic but not the other. In the next two sections, I will outline Menke’s
characterization of the two big ways that Adorno’s work in Aesthetic Theory is
misunderstood. This is done in an attempt to understand how it is that aesthetic negativity
can lead to an artistic political praxis.
The Socio-Critical Misconception
The first misconception that Menke lays out is that art’s value lies in its function
as a critique of nonaesthetic reality (McCarthy and Menke 1999, 3). Menke calls this idea
the socio-critical misconception. In this misconception, art is the critical negation of
society – it brings to bear potentialities, capabilities, and insights, which can, in principle,
be removed from the aesthetic and applied to the nonaesthetic. The critical negations that
aesthetic negativity provides under this conception are not limited to the aesthetic sphere,
but rather can be extrapolated to the nonaesthetic and function directly as a critique of
society. This conception seems to entirely misunderstand how Adorno conceives of
critical artistic praxis. Adorno writes: “[Art’s] contribution to society is not
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communication with it but rather something extremely mediated: It is resistance in which,
by virtue of inner-aesthetic development, social development is reproduced without being
imitated” (Adorno 1997, 226). The socio-critical misconception is wrong because it
attempts to use art as a direct articulation of social critique and in direct communication
with the social reality. This misconception completely misses the requirement that
Adorno set for a critical artistic praxis – that it be autonomous. The socio-critical
misconception seems to reject aesthetic autonomy for a sociocritical understanding of art.
This view is unsatisfactory, according to Menke, because it “levels the difference
between aesthetic and moral experience, and thus fails to grasp a defining feature of
aesthetic autonomy” (McCarthy and Menke 1999, 8). That is, if aesthetic critique
requires autonomy, this view of negativity does not acknowledge the autonomy in art and
thus fails under Adorno’s model. Thinking of aesthetic negativity as only the
contradiction between the social meaning of the work of art and the society in which it
exists only allows the art to offer direct critique that does not move beyond the trappings
of society. The charge that Adorno levels against Benjamin is that Benjamin equates
aesthetic experience with a moral or political one, and that is why Adorno thinks
Benjamin fails to see the true critical potential of art. Adorno thinks that what is truly
critical in art “is its immanent movement against society, not its manifest opinions”
(Adorno 1997, 227). The social function that can be predicated for critical works of art is
their functionlessness – artworks not being used as a means to convey particular
messages allows them to be critical of the the instrumentalization of things that exist
under the culture industry.
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Works of art cannot exist only autonomously, however, as they also exist in
society. I think Adorno sees the moral understanding of aesthetics as existing alongside
one based on autonomy. Art “measures its profundity by whether or not it can, through
the reconciliation that its formal law brings to contradictions, emphasize the real lack of
reconciliation all the more” (McCarthy and Menke 1999, 8). Menke believes that
Adorno’s conception of autonomy requires a different set of criteria for judgment of a
work of art besides its moral value – he calls these criteria for value aesthetic pleasure
(McCarthy and Menke 1999, 8). Art’s ability to emphasize contradictions and our
attempts at reconciling them is just as important as the aesthetic pleasure derived from its
autonomy. The critical role of art is not to reflect the society in which it exists but rather
to exist in a negative dialectical relationship with it. In this way, aesthetic pleasure, or
art’s autonomous value, is as necessary as art’s moral value in the way that it offers
critique in society.
Seeing the value of aesthetic pleasure is not the same as reducing art to a form of
amusement or recreation. Both aesthetic pleasure and amusement require that art be
somehow separated from the society in which it inhabits. The difference between
aesthetic pleasure and amusement is that the former allows art to express some truth
content, while the latter neutralizes it. Adorno writes: “...once artworks are entombed in
the pantheon of cultural commodities, they themselves – their truth content – are also
damaged” (Adorno 1997, 228). Adorno believes that works of art are usually critical in
the era in which they are made, but they later become neutralized because of changed
social relations. That is, the work becomes removed from the social relations around it,
and that is the source of its neutralization. For art to have aesthetic pleasure, then, it must
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necessarily be social – only when the work exists dialectically in a sociohistorical frame
can it exhibit any truth content.20 In Aesthetic Theory, Adorno rejects art as “recreational
activity” that is done only in the “evening hours” of the working day (Adorno 1998, 182).
This rejection targets the equation of aesthetic pleasure with amusement as outlined in
my first chapter. This is a rejection of the lack of distinction between aesthetic and
nonaesthetic forms of pleasure, and rejection of art solely “as a vehicle for the
satisfaction of needs and desires” (Adorno 1998, 182). It is not a rejection of the
detachment from object in aesthetic experience that Adorno thinks is necessary for art.
The amusement characterized here and in my first chapter is one in which one is
allowed to forget human suffering or not even ever have to think about it. Art is
amusement and recreation in that it becomes a distraction from the reality of our
condition which, according to Adorno, good art is supposed to bring our attention to.
Amusement means forgetting and not having to think about suffering; in contrast, a truly
aesthetic experience brings forth suffering that is hidden from us. Thus, amusement
cannot be what aesthetic pleasure is comprised of. The amusement characterized in the
culture industry is based on diversion, and the pleasure derived from it is from satisfying
or diverting a need or desire. Menke writes: “Adorno explains the pleasure of amusement
as an ‘identity,’ ‘imitation,’ or ‘repetition’ experienced in a ‘state of diversion’”
(McCarthy and Menke 1999, 11). For Adorno, true aesthetic pleasure arises out of a
negative process that is directed critically toward conventional amusement. Aesthetic
pleasure is supposed to bring to light the unsatisfactory nature of conventional
amusement and desire-satisfaction. “The uniqueness of aesthetic enjoyment,” writes
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Menke, “is based on pleasure from that which does not let itself be recognized or
identified” (McCarthy and Menke 1999, 12).
The Purist Misconception
Menke characterizes the purist misconception of Adorno’s aesthetic autonomy as
a view that removes the social from aesthetic negativity. This misconception states that
art is a place where the intensity of lived experience is increased in relation to that of
nonaesthetic reality. That is, there is something about the experience of art that sets it
apart from nonaesthetic reality in an incommensurable way (McCarthy and Menke 1999,
4). Essentially, it states that there exists an insurmountable divide between art and
society, and the lived experience that art promises is pure only when it is indifferent to
social reality (McCarthy and Menke 1999, 4). The purist misconception collapses the
concept of aesthetic autonomy into that of aesthetic pleasure without taking into
consideration the social aspect that is required for aesthetic negativity. “Such pleasure
arises not in direct confrontation with an object, in our rationally or sensuously testing its
qualities, but in our reflective recourse or return to the process of experiencing the
object” (McCarthy and Menke 1999, 13). Aesthetic pleasure is what happens when we
aesthetically experience an object; it is not an unmediated response or reaction to the
object. Negativity, then, is the aesthetic process of experience from which we extract
pleasure or displeasure. Aesthetic experience is an experiential event that may not have
innate aesthetic qualities, but is transformed negatively to reflect aesthetic pleasure or
displeasure.
Menke suggests that we can understand Adorno better when we realize that
aesthetic negativity underlies the process of aesthetic experience (McCarthy and Menke
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1999, 14). That is, negativity is not equivalent to aesthetic experience because this
negativity is necessary for aesthetic experience to even happen. This formulation of
aesthetic negativity satisfies a condition of aesthetic autonomy in that it is a concept
entirely different from any other kinds of pleasure (moral, sensuous, etc.), and shows that
the difference between aesthetic pleasure and sensuous pleasure is structural, not just
gradual. Aesthetic pleasure is also not equivalent to sensuous pleasure because the
pleasure of art comes from its negativity; thus, there is something different about art that
makes it valuable besides its ability to please us. Adorno writes: “Even when artworks
divest themselves of every atmospheric element … it is conserved in them as a negated
and shunned element” (Adorno 1998, 274). That is, even when art does not serve us as
something that brings us sensuous pleasure (for example art may be ugly or jarring or not
pleasant to look at); it still serves a function as something that reflects the negative
dialectical relationship between the realm of ideas and objects. Though one may take
sensual pleasure in recognizing the beauty or desire-satisfaction of a work of art, the
aesthetic pleasure that Adorno wants to say is necessary for a work to be critical is a
property that is separate from it. So to enjoy a work’s sensual pleasure and to enjoy its
aesthetic pleasure are two separable experiences. The purist who collapses negativity into
a concept of pleasure is mistaken because aesthetic negativity is more than mere pleasure;
it exists in a category outside of other kinds of pleasure in that it is entirely dialectical.
Menke explains the negativity in aesthetic experience as the breakdown or failure
of our attempts at understanding (McCarthy and Menke 1999, 27). When we attempt to
ascribe concepts or ideas to the objects of experience (in this case, art), we are faced with
a problem of representation. The object cannot represent the concept, as, because of its

45
negative dialectical relationship to the concept, it is both more and less than the concept.
The aesthetic experience, then, arises out of this negative space between the object and
the concept, neither of which are aesthetic before the tension arises. Aesthetic pleasure is
achieved when we experience an object beyond understanding and are released or
emancipated from this experience. In such a case, negative dialectical understanding of
the aesthetic is one, which takes the aesthetic experience, without reducing it to its
sociocritical function or conflating aesthetic experience with sensuous pleasure. Art is
sovereign and autonomous, and in some way seems like it stands outside of our
experience of social reality. This is where the first misconception of aesthetic negativity
comes into play – art cannot be a critical thing that simply serves a moral pleasure
because art goes beyond our sociocritical reality and can be in a privileged position.
Political Praxis and Aesthetic Negativity
Adorno does indeed believe in the political potential of artistic praxis, and does
see that art has emancipatory potential. However, he is vehemently opposed to the
politicization of art, the turning of art into merely a political object, for doing so does not
allow us to escape the reasoning that is tied up with the existing social relations. Adorno
believes that reducing art to something heteronomous and entirely socially contingent, as
he believes Benjamin is attempting to do, strips art of its critical power because it makes
art subject to the exchange society that the culture industry functions in. Adorno writes:
“Arkworks are plenipotentiaries of things that are no longer distorted by exchange, profit,
and the false needs of a degraded humanity” (Adorno 1997, 227). Adorno rejects
fetishism only insofar as it is commodity fetishism that the culture industry engages in;
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the fetishism that arises out of autonomy contains what he calls “the organon of truth”
(Adorno 1997, 227).
According to Espen Hammer, there is a connection between the impact of art and
the political questions of how universal interest is to be articulated and translated into
praxis (Hammer 2005, 131). Hammer believes that art partakes in politics by
withdrawing from society, allowing art to speak in a voice that “fundamentally
challenges present arrangements” (Hammer 2005, 134). Adorno certainly thinks that art
can offer a critique of present political arrangements, but he does not see this as a direct
articulation of critique that is spelled out in the message or concepts that the artwork is
supposed to try to convey. The critique is a result of the artwork’s aesthetic negativity,
which arises out of the tension between the work’s autonomy, and the social reality in
which it exists. Adorno writes, “Every authentic artwork is internally revolutionary”
because he sees the political potential of art in the art object itself as it stands (Adorno
1997, 228). So long as a work of art is autonomous, it will be dialectical, and thus be able
to be critical. Though Adorno sees the culture industry as something to be opposed, he
does not believe that a direct critique of the existing social reality is a good way to go
about it. I believe that he makes this move because he thinks that a direct critique does
not allow for us to be able to shed ourselves of the lens and the line of reasoning that led
to the creation of the culture industry in the first place.
Adorno makes some ambitious claims about the political implications of art. Art,
even when it exists to negate the society that it inhabits, is still a mode of praxis. Hammer
believes that there is a connection between art’s autonomy and the “overtly political
question of how universal interest is to be articulated and translated into rational, non-
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violent praxis” (Hammer 2007, 131). Adorno writes that the truth content of art cannot be
separated from the concept of humanity, and through negativity, art acts as images of a
transformed humanity (Adorno 1997, 241). Aesthetic truth is transformative in that it
allows us to see the society in which we live while maintaining an autonomous lens
outside of said society. Here, it seems that Adorno is falling back into a notion of a
universal humanity that can be articulated, and in light of the rise of multiculturalism and
identity politics, this may appear to be very problematic. Hammer suggests that we read
Adorno’s claim as “making a claim to community” rather than speaking in the name of
some universal humanity (Hammer 2007, 133). Although art may withdraw from the
actual community in which it inhabits, it can still be seen as partaking in politics by
challenging the present arrangements, something it can do only because of its distance
and autonomy from said arrangements. Hammer writes: “Art needs to embody a claim to
resistance that can be exercised in a space within which it is free to follow its own logic”
(Hammer 2007, 138). This must occur, and when art addresses the interests of the stifled
and repressed, it must do so solely as art, and not as mere documentation, propaganda, or
illustration.
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Chapter III: Praxis in Hegemony
Cultural Workers and Production
Mouffe sees Adorno and Horkheimer’s project to indicate that the advent of the
culture industry began the moment “the Fordist mode of production finally managed to
enter into the field of culture” (Mouffe 2013a, 85). However, she believes that there is
divergence in envisaging different forms of resistance, for she does not believe that the
total power of capitalism is quite so totalizing. Adorno sees the space for autonomy
within negative dialectical space in particular works of art, but Mouffe sees a different
vision. Adorno and Horkheimer’s analysis of the culture industry relies heavily on the
way that art is produced in capitalism, with centralized production and widespread
distribution. Mouffe argues that their analysis is not useful for trying to examine new
modes of production that exist in our digital age (Mouffe 2013a, 86).21 She makes the
argument that Adorno and Horkheimer’s analysis may not be so useful a guide to
examining some new forms of production because it is based on the Fordist model
(Mouffe 2013b, 207). That is, it is possible to envisage different forms of resistance and
different strategies for opposition through the new forms of production that are now
dominant today in the current post-Fordist mode of production (Mouffe 2013b, 207). For
examples of new modes of production, Mouffe draws in Paolo Virno, who writes about
how, with the advent of technology, labor is now more intellectual than physical (Mouffe
2013a, 87).22
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Mouffe, in Agonistics, outlines some imaginative ways of envisioning the
production and proliferation of capitalism today. Labor today is not tied to material goods
in the same way that it was in the past – the booming tech and information industries are
a testament to that. Mouffe calls this ‘advanced capitalism,’ and argues that the labor
process in this kind of production is now performative in the same way that a performing
artists’ work is (Mouffe 2013a, 86). In this modern age, “the boundaries between pure
intellectual activity, political action, and labor have dissolved” because they are
supported by homogeneous principles and criteria (Mouffe 2013a, 87). That is, these
fields used to be separate in their ends and their actions, but have become more similar
because of the way capitalism and globalization have changed our world. The good news
is, that new ways of envisaging resistance are now opened up due to this new
configuration. Mouffe states that the goal of artistic practices should be to help transform
the work process by producing new subjectivities and helping us envision worlds that we
did not think are possible (Mouffe 2013a, 87). Bringing to light new subjectivities
includes bringing to fore identities and persons who would otherwise be forgotten under a
dominant hegemonic narrative. For example, the people used by Hamas as human shields
were not seen as subjects and therefore their loss was not seen as grievable. Victims of
drone strikes are simply called insurgents, not allowing for them to be recognized as
subjects or as people. Because the perpetuation and transformation of capitalism relies at
least partially on our role in the culture industry, artistic practices can help us envision
ourselves as subjects that have power to change capitalism through the powers of culture.
To understand how we can change our relationship with the dominant culture of
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consumerism, we must first understand how art can allow us to engage in a critical
perspective.
Artistic intervention can be wielded to oppose the absolute mobilization of art by
capitalism because culture plays a role in creating and transforming capitalism under
post-Fordism. The objective of artistic praxis, for Mouffe, then, is to undermine the
environment necessary for capitalist reproduction (Mouffe 2013a, 88). A task for those
engaged in agonistic hegemonic struggle, then, is the production of new subjectivities.
Mouffe believes that, considering how capitalism operates today, this task is more
important than ever (Mouffe 2013b, 212). Capitalism today relies on semiotic techniques
to create modes of subjectivation that are necessary for its reproduction.23 Like Adorno
and Horkheimer, she sees the new forms of exploitation in the constant creation of new
needs and desire for the acquisition of goods (Mouffe 2013b, 212). Because Mouffe’s
goal with art is to undermine the social environment for capitalist reproduction, she
believes that art can contribute to a struggle against capitalist domination only when we
first understand the dynamics of democratic politics. To understand art’s struggle against
capitalist domination, we must first acknowledge the antagonism she sees is inherent in
politics and the contingency of social orders.
Antagonism and the Political
Mouffe makes a distinction between ‘the political’ and ‘politics.’ She writes:
“‘The political’ refers to this dimension of antagonism which can take many forms and
can emerge in diverse social relations. It is a dimension that can never be eradicated”
(Mouffe 2013a, 2). I take this to mean that the political is defined by the antagonism that
23
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is inherent in social orders. Politics, then, is taken to be: “the ensemble of practices,
discourses and institutions that seeks to establish a certain order” (Mouffe 2013a, 2).
Politics are the series of contingent practices that organize human existence and are
affected by the political.
Mouffe suggests that politics, which always deals with the formation of collective
identity, requires the demarcation between a ‘we’ and a ‘they’ (Mouffe 2013a, 5). The
problem with pluralist liberal democratic politics, for Mouffe, is that it tries to defuse “the
potential antagonism that exists in human relations” (Mouffe 2013a, 6). Mouffe sees that
as a problem because that involves the construction of an ‘us’ that does not have a
corresponding ‘them.’ This is impossible because the antagonistic nature of ‘the political’
requires that there necessarily be a ‘them.’ How, then, can we establish an us/them
distinction that is still compatible with pluralistic politics? Mouffe writes: “What liberal
democratic politics requires is that the others are not seen as enemies to be destroyed, but
as adversaries whose ideas might be fought, even fiercely, but whose right to defend
those ideas is not to be questioned” (Mouffe 2013a, 7). The conflict ought not take the
form of ‘antagonism’ but the form of ‘agonism.’ The difference between the two lies in
the idea that the former is a struggle between enemies, whereas the latter is a struggle
between adversaries. In agonistic politics, the distinction between the ‘we’ and the ‘they’
is one of adversaries rather than enemies. “This can be done,” writes Mouffe, “by
fostering an ensemble of institutions, practices and language games which will make it
possible for conflicts to take an ‘agonistic’ form instead of an ‘antagonistic’ one”
(Mouffe 2013b, 211). The difference between the two lies in the idea that the former is a
struggle between enemies, whereas the latter is a struggle between adversaries. In
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agonistic politics, the distinction between the ‘we’ and the ‘they’ is one of adversaries
rather than enemies. Mouffe writes: “This supposes that, although they are in conflict,
they nevertheless see themselves as belonging to the same political association as their
opponents with whom they share a common symbolic space within which their conflict
takes place” (Mouffe 2013b, 210).
This does not mean that an antagonistic relationship will necessarily end up being
adversarial. That is, the us/them relationship “might become one of friend/enemy”
(Mouffe 2013a, 5). The antagonism that characterizes politics need not always be a
friendly adversarial one, and can often be one where we are instead actively trying to
destroy our enemies. Even with agonistic politics, the adversarial way of engaging with
conflict is something that should be worked for and is processual. The condition that
allows for the possibility that there exist political identities is the same condition that
does not allow antagonism to be eliminated from our society (Mouffe 2013a, 5). So even
the formation of adversarial relationships between two opposing parties requires some
form of mutual respect, or at the very least the respect that your opponent has the right to
defend their ideas to the best of their abilities. I think that is the difference between
antagonistic and agonistic relationships even amongst adversaries. According to this
agonistic perspective, the opponent should be seen as an adversary, not an enemy. The
adversary is someone ‘with whom one shares a common allegiance to the democratic
principles of ‘liberty and equality for all,’ while disagreeing about their interpretation”
(Mouffe 2013a, 7). Adversaries respect their opponent’s rights to fight for their position,
while enemies do not. Mouffe thinks this is the condition necessary for a vibrant
democracy. Mouffe points out that even in a consensual democracy, there will always be
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disagreement concerning the meaning of democratic values, and thus the consensus will
always be a conflictual one (Mouffe 2013a, 8). The confrontation in agonistic democracy
is real, according to Mouffe, but still “one that is played out under conditions regulated
by a set of democratic procedures accepted by the adversaries” (Mouffe 2013a, 9).24
The problem with liberalism, for Mouffe, lies in envisaging the problems we face
in a political way – her argument is that political problems are not technical issues that
can be solved mechanistically via rational argumentation, but rather involve choosing
between conflicting and sometimes intractable alternatives. Mouffe lays out the role that
liberalism has played in our ability to think politically. The dominant tendency in
liberalism is to have a rationalist and individualist view that does not allow us to
adequately grasp pluralism in a social world. The liberal understanding of pluralism is
that we live in a world with a variety of perspectives, but we may never be able to adopt
all of them. However, the chorus of all the perspectives together constitutes what
consensus liberals see as “a harmonious ensemble” (Mouffe 2007, 2). This liberal view,
which Mouffe thinks is characterized by the work of philosopher John Rawls, is wrong in
Mouffe’s view, because she believes they are ontologically mistaken about how politics
function. This means that Mouffe disagrees with the kinds of things that they take for
granted in politics, like the idea that a consensus can be reached through rational
deliberation. Mouffe argues that liberal theorists fail to see that antagonism characterizes
human societies, and that the achievement of a liberal consensus is not possible. That is,
24
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there exists conflicts where there is no rational solution: “The denial of ‘the political’ in
its antagonistic dimension is, I have argued, what prevents liberal theory from envisaging
politics in an adequate way” (Mouffe 2013a, 3). Because the liberalism of deliberative
politics always seeks to find some kind of rational, mutually agreed consensus, it fails to
understand the fundamental antagonistic nature of some of our political conflicts (Mouffe
2007, 2). Mouffe believes that liberal individualism also fails to account for the formation
of collective identities, and in that way, it fails to understand the political, which is
always dealing with the formation of ‘we’ (Mouffe 2013a, 4).
Agonism and Hegemony
Part of the reality of antagonism in politics is that every social order can be
displaced by another social order. Mouffe writes: “Those practices of articulation through
which a certain order is created and the meaning of social institutions fixed, we call
‘hegemonic practices’” (Mouffe 2013b, 210). Every order, then, is a temporary and
precarious articulation of contingent practices. This points to the hegemonic nature of
every social order. That is, society is “the product of practices attempting at establishing
order in a context of contingency” (Mouffe 2007, 2). Here, it seems that every order is
the precarious and historically bound articulation of contingent practices, and every order
is predicated on the exclusion of some other possibility. Because the United States is a
representative democracy, it cannot possibly be a direct democracy, and trying to
reconcile the two does not make sense. A consensus liberal would not be able to reconcile
the two views and would have to pick one over the other, but the consensus liberal would
frame the conflict in a way that does not acknowledge the irreconcilability of the two
(sometimes equally valid) positions, instead couching his choice in a language of
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rationality. The argument of the consensus liberal is couched in a language of rationality,
where consensus can be achieved if discourse is sufficiently rational. This standpoint of
universalism and rationality does not adequately acknowledge the importance of
pluralism for democracy. The consensus liberal would argue for how an opposing view
must clearly be rejected on the grounds that their argument is more ‘rational’ their
opponents.’ This, Mouffe would argue, is a failure to take the pluralism of democracy
seriously. Mouffe writes: “… the domain of politics … is not a neutral terrain that could
be insulated from the pluralism of values and where rational, universal solutions could be
formulated” (Mouffe 1999, 8).
Central also to her understanding of hegemonic struggle is an agonistic
conception of democracy. Agonistic struggle is “a configuration of power relations
around which a given society is structured” (Mouffe 2007, 3). The struggle between
opposing hegemonic projects, according to Mouffe, cannot be reconciled rationally. An
agonistic conception of democracy acknowledges the contingent character of society at
any given moment and sees society as a series of precarious and pragmatic constructions
that are sedimented and hegemonic. It recognizes that any hegemonic construction is still
precarious in that it can be “disarticulated and transformed as the result of agonistic
struggle” (Mouffe 2013b, 210). Mouffe criticizes those who ignore the contingent nature
of politics and reduce politics “to a set of supposedly technical moves and neutral
procedures” (Mouffe 2007, 3).
Under capitalism, the “control of souls” plays a role in governing our desires and
passions (Mouffe 2013b, 212). This is why advertising plays such an important role in the
perpetuation of capitalism. That is, the role that advertising plays is not simply to
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promote products but to produce a world or a way of imagining the world where
consumers can imagine themselves as part of an imagined community based on the
particular goods that they consume (Mouffe 2013b, 212). A reason capitalism is so
pervasive is that the construction of the consumer’s identity is tied in to the things that
they buy. Because capitalism’s hegemony is maintained by mobilizing people’s desires,
Mouffe believes that a disarticulation through counter-hegemonic practice must include
engaging with the terrain of desire and passions. The creation of new subjectivities and
forms of identification, then, become fair game in agonistic counter-hegemonic struggle
(Mouffe 2013b, 212).
Public Space
Public space, for Mouffe, is envisioned as the place in which democracy can be
practiced. Public space is not constituted only of tangible, physical spaces but also of the
different terrains in which politics is practiced. There are different articulations of public
space that exist. Mouffe’s agonistic construction of public space has certain
consequences. Mouffe writes: “Its main contribution is to challenge the widespread
conception that, albeit in different ways, informs most visions of public space conceived
as the terrain where one should aim at creating consensus” (Mouffe 2013b, 213). For
theorists like Habermas, it is the place where a rational consensus can take place through
deliberation. I have outlined some of the objections that Mouffe has to a consensus
democracy in the previous sections. The problem for Mouffe, though, is not an empirical
one but an ontological one. That is, rational consensus is a conceptual impossibility
because consensus without exclusion is impossible under the agonistic model. The
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obstacles to rationalist views like “the original position” or “the ideal discourse” are not
merely an empirical impossibility (Mouffe 2000, 13).
Hannah Arendt is another theorist famous for her agonistic model of politics.
Mouffe, however, does not believe that Arendt’s model is properly agonistic, for she
believes Arendt is trying to set up an ‘agonism without antagonism.’ Arendt, in her work,
emphasizes the importance of human plurality but forgets to acknowledge that the
plurality itself is the origin of antagonistic conflict. That is, there cannot possibly be a
plurality without antagonism. Mouffe characterizes Arendt’s conception of agonism as,
“to think politically is to develop the ability to see things from a multiplicity of
perspectives” (Mouffe 2007, 4). While Arendt emphasizes plurality, community, and
reciprocity of human beings, she does not acknowledge the antagonistic origin of such a
plurality (Mouffe 2013b, 213). While this may seem like a good agonistic model, Mouffe
thinks that this makes her view no different than that of the liberal, for it hints at
intersubjective agreement underneath the supposed agonism through her use of Kant’s
idea of ‘enlarged thought’ (Mouffe 2013b, 213). Arendt, like Habermas, appears to
believe that consensus emerges through the use of public space. Mouffe sees the
difference between Arendt and Habermas through their different uses of rational
consensus. While for Arendt, consensus emerges out of the exchange of voice and
opinion (doxa), for Habermas it emerges through rational discourse (Mouffe 2007, 4).
Mouffe believes that Arendt sees agreement or consensus as something to be achieved
through persuasion and negotiation, since it emerges out of the exchange of opinion – the
point is to sway your opponent’s opinion to match your own. Neither of these models
acknowledges the hegemonic nature that Mouffe believes characterizes every consensus.
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The suggestion here is that antagonism is ineradicable. Mouffe sees her agonism as
similar to Arendt’s but different in some fundamental ways. While Arendt stresses the
plurality and multiplicity of views, Mouffe stresses the impossibility of a final
reconciliation in a way that Arendt’s does not. Mouffe writes:
Both approaches assert that under modern democratic conditions, the
people cannot be envisaged as ‘one.’ But while in the first approach the
people is seen as ‘multiple,’ in the second the people appears as ‘divided.’
It is only when division and antagonism are recognized as being
ineradicable that it is possible to think in a properly political way. (Mouffe
2013a, 15)
So Mouffe thinks that people are fundamentally divided in a way that she believes Arendt
does not recognize.
The problem with other models of agonism like those outlined by Connolly and
Honig is that they fail to account for two dimensions that Mouffe believes are central to
politics: antagonism and hegemony (Mouffe 2013a, 14). Mouffe believes that these other
agonistic theories celebrate a politics of disturbance but do not recognize the other side of
the struggle, which is the construction of an alternative hegemony. “It is not enough,” she
writes, “to unsettle the dominant procedures and to disrupt the existing arrangements in
order to radicalize democracy” (Mouffe 2013a, 14). For Mouffe, because hegemony is
necessarily part of the political process, any disarticulation of an existing hegemony
requires the rearticulation of a new one. An agonistic politics that fails to recognize this
process of rearticulation fails to account for an important part of the hegemonic process.
Visualizing public spaces in an agonistic model is important for artistic practices because
it allows us to envisage how such practices can contribute to the hegemonic struggle
(Mouffe 2013b, 213). Artistic practices can penetrate realms of society that other forms
of resistance may not be able to. For example, there are sedimented hegemonic practices
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that become ingrained in the way that we view the world, and it becomes difficult to see
outside of them. Mouffe sees artistic practices as being able to penetrate the realm of the
social and not just the political.
Mouffe writes that it is important to be able to distinguish the social from the
political, and I will attempt to do this here. She writes, “The political is linked to the acts
of hegemonic institution” (Mouffe 2007, 3), and “the social is the realm of sedimented
practices” (Mouffe 2007, 4). While the political is based on the particular acts of the
institutions, the social is the set of practices that are taken for granted. When the
hegemony becomes social, their origins in political institutions is taken for granted or
forgotten about, and certain modes of organization become seen as a given and
unquestionable. For example, under our modern nation-state style of organizing humans,
some things about human nature are assumed, and the possibility for non-hierarchical or
non-state centered order is not taken into consideration as possible modes of
organization. The idea is that political institutions can become sedimented into social
institutions when the origins of the social practice are forgotten and become seen as
constitutive of the particular society.25 She believes that the only reason neo-liberal
hegemony is thought to be a natural consequence of technological progress is because its
political origins have been erased through a process of sedimentation turning the actions
from political to social (Mouffe 2013a, 89). “That is why,” she writes, “neo-liberal
practices and institutions appear as the outcome of natural processes, as a fate that we
have to accept because ‘there is no alternative’” (Mouffe 2013a, 89).

25

Such an assumption or sedimented social institution is the thought that capitalism is necessary for
democracy.
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Mouffe writes that the social and the political are “existentials” that are necessary
for societal life – that is, societal life as we know it exists only because social and
political institutions are in play (Mouffe 2007, 2). It is impossible, however, to determine
what is the social and what is the political out of their particular context. The space
between the social and the political is unstable, and often requires renegotiation. That is,
something that is political can eventually become sedimented as social and something
that was considered social can suddenly be examined for its political origins or
institutions. So the social institution of heterosexual marriage, for example, can be taken
apart and examined for its political origins and suddenly it becomes a political institution
that is as contingent as any other. Here, we see how the social and the political are
expressions of particular power relations. What we can learn from this argument is that
the “natural order” at any given moment is simply the result of sedimented hegemonic
practices that lack any deeper objectivity. Mouffe writes, “The practices through which
an order is established as ‘natural’ are hegemonic practices” (Mouffe 2007, 3).26 Here, I
think, lies Mouffe’s understanding of the potential of art – every hegemonic practice, she
argues, can be challenged by counter-hegemonic practices which attempt to disrupt the
existing order to install a new hegemony. Here, it seems, the critical potential in art lies in
its ability to articulate this new hegemony or, at the very least, disarticulate the
environment needed to maintain the existing hegemony (Mouffe 2013a, 90).
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I do not see how the social is different than the political. Just because the social is comprised of
sedimented hegemonic practices does not mean that it is in any way functioning differently than what
Mouffe calls the political. I do not know why she thinks it is important to make this distinction, which I see
as merely a psychological one. Hegemonic orders do not achieve legitimacy simply through social
sedimentation. Concepts and orders that are sedimented into the social to the point where we cannot see
how we can live without them are just as contingent as any other, and Mouffe says so as well. I think she
uses this distinction to show that some concepts are sedimented, and those are the ones that must be put
into question.
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In Mouffe’s agonistic model, the public space is the battleground for hegemonic
projects. The difference between her conception of public space and those of theorists
before her like Arendt and Habermas is that there is no possibility of a final
reconciliation. Further, public spaces are never singular but always plural – that is, there
are always multiple public spaces. Public spaces are always striated and hegemonically
structured with no predetermined center, and always allow for diverse forms of
articulation. The hegemony results from a specific articulation of space, and hegemonic
struggle is an attempt to create different forms of articulation in public spaces. These
things, Mouffe believes, are necessary to have a truly agonistic public space that can host
artistic resistance.
Critical Artistic Resistance
There exists disagreement about how resistance can be deployed in relation to
established institutions. According to Mouffe, there are two possibilities for how art can
behave – artists can either engage with established institutions or they can desert the
existing institutions for a number of reasons. Those who call for a strategy of withdrawal
argue that artistic institutions are entirely complicit with capitalism and it is no longer
possible to achieve critical art within an institutional frame due to the pervasiveness of
the culture industry (Mouffe 2007, 4). Under this model, cultural workers are entirely
instrumentalized in a way that leaves them only able to reproduce the capitalist system
that already exists. For these people, resistance must necessarily be located outside of
institutions. This may seem like a pessimistic view of the place of resistance under
capitalism, but there are also those who believe in the Exodus as a legitimate form of
resistance for other reasons. Paolo Virno writes that, in post-Fordist society, traditional
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structures of power are becoming irrelevant and will eventually fade away (Mouffe
2013a, 68). Because these structures are no longer useful, opposition within them is also
no longer effective. Virno discourages collaboration with traditional political channels for
that reason, and his idea is that we must construct a non-state public sphere and a
democracy that is nonrepresentative and extra-parliamentary (Mouffe 2013a, 69-70).
The possibility for resistance that Mouffe is going to argue for is one of
engagement. She believes that the social is revealed through a multiplicity of discursive
practices. That is, the social world is constructed, and that construction is a result of a
particular hegemony. Mouffe believes that society is always politically constituted, and
the social is a result of sedimented political practices (Mouffe, 2012). This view
highlights the idea that hegemonic confrontation is not just limited to that of traditional
institutions, but also engages in civil society. This point of view discourages a politics of
desertion because desertion fails to engage with the terrain in which our subjectivities are
constructed. That is, because our subjectivities are constituted socially, without engaging
in the social terrain, we cannot actually change the existing hegemony. A politics of
desertion favors abandoning existing social institutions in favor of constructing new ones,
but without disarticulating the ones that exist, there is no way that cultural and artistic
practices can play a decisive role in the disarticulation of hegemony. Mouffe writes: “As
the temporary and precarious articulation of contingent practices, every order is an
expression of a particular structure of power relations” (Mouffe, 2012). The domain of
culture is one where hegemonic practices are built and subjectivities are constructed.
Within the hegemonic approach, artistic practices are part of the contingent practices and
are always political – they either reproduce a given hegemony or they challenge it.
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Counter-hegemonic practices are characterized by the disarticulation of existing
hegemony and the rearticulation of new social orders. Art and cultural production is, in
fact, vital for the valorization of capital. To acknowledge the political dimension of
artistic intervention means relinquishing the idea that to be political, we must make a
total break with the existing state of affairs to create something new. A withdrawal from
institutions as advocated in some conceptions of resistance like those advocated for by
theorists like Paolo Virno is not a good enough strategy because it does not stop the
reproduction of culture under a capitalist system.
Mouffe argues that just because the artists of today can no longer pretend to
constitute an ‘avant-garde’ that is differentiated from and separate from existing
institutions does not mean that the political role of the artist is over. Mouffe writes that
artists must abandon the illusion of their privileged position (Mouffe 2007, 5). Critical
artistic practices, for Mouffe, engage in the institutional terrain with the aim of fostering
dissent and creating new agonistic spaces where dominant consensus is challenged as
new identifications are made available. How, then, can artistic practice contribute to the
questioning of the dominant hegemony? Is the objective of critical artistic practice to
unveil the oppression instituted by a dominant consensus or to create a critical
alternative? According to Mouffe’s agonism, critical art is art that “foments dissensus,
that makes visible what the dominant consensus tends to obscure and obliterate” (Mouffe
2013a, 4). It is constituted by particular practices aimed at giving voice to those silenced
within a framework of an existing hegemony. Artistic practices can play a role in the
construction of new forms of subjectivity, but it is through using resources, which induce
emotional responses that can reach humans at an affective level (Mouffe 2013a, 98).
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Mouffe believes that the power of artistic practices lie in their ability to make us feel
things and thus be able to perceive things in a different way. “The point,” she writes, “is
not meant to deny that there is a cognitive dimension to art, but to assert that it is through
the affects that it can reach the intellect” (Mouffe 2013a, 97).
To illustrate this, she points to the artist Alfredo Jaar, whose work she believes is
a great example of an aesthetic of resistance (Mouffe 2013a, 94). Jaar is a ‘project artist,’
whose work Mouffe believes contributes to the production of counter-hegemonic
practices. The way that Jaar successfully engages in this is by his method of production,
which involves disarticulating an existing ‘common sense,’ and fostering a variety of
public spaces that constitute a counter-hegemony (Mouffe 2013a, 94-95). Jaar attempts to
make people question their unexamined beliefs by practices that are exemplified by his
‘Questions Questions’ project that involved tactics such as occupying available public
spaces for a period of time to “restore the meaning of the public space, which had been
erased by the control of Berlusconi” (Mouffe 2013a, 95). When asked to create an
installation in a city that lacked an art exhibition building, Jaar built a faux exhibition
building made of paper, helping the town to realize their need for such a space (Mouffe,
95-96). This is an example of how art contributes to our realization of a need and
arousing a desire for change. The town later had Jaar design and build the exhibition hall.
Jaar’s example illustrates a way of engaging in institutions in a critical way, by pointing
out the parts of them that are flawed, and at the same time working to rectify them.
Mouffe believes that these rectifications are possible not because of art’s pointing to any
cognitive truth, but rather because of art’s ability to impact our affects and emotions.
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Mouffe believes that there are many ways of engaging with institutions and
challenging the existing consensus with art, and one such way is consisted of artistic
activism (Mouffe 2013a, 97). Artistic activism, or ‘artivism,’ puts aesthetic means at the
service of political activism, and she believes that this artivism is a counter-hegemonic
move against capitalist appropriation of aesthetics (Mouffe 2012). The political character
of artistic activism can be understood when we see them as counter-hegemonic projects
occupying the public space to disrupt the smooth image of corporate capitalism,
“bringing to fore its repressive character” (Mouffe 2013a, 5). An example of this that
Mouffe provides is that of the Yes Men, who pretended to be representatives of the
World Trade Organization to ‘correct’ the image that the organization was attempting to
project (Mouffe 2013a, 97). “Their aim,” writes Mouffe, “is to target institutions that
foster neo-liberalism at the expense of people’s well-being, and they do this by assuming
the identities of these institutions in order to offer correctives” (Mouffe 2013. 98).
Mouffe believes that putting aesthetics in the service of activism can be seen as a
counter-hegemonic move against capitalist appropriation of aesthetics.
Though Mouffe believes that art can foment agonistic contestation and contribute
to the creation of new subjectivities, there are indeed limits to the power of art. For one,
art is not an adequate substitute for other forms of political practices, and cannot bring
about any new hegemonic order on their own. That is, new political subjectivities is only
one dimension of agonistic struggle, one which agonism does successfully satisfy.
Though Mouffe believes that artistic practices are important in democratic politics, she
thinks it is a mistake to believe that artistic practices alone can bring about the end to
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neo-liberal hegemony (Mouffe 2007, 5). That is, she thinks aesthetic resistance is only
one dimension out of many for the unseating of neoliberal capitalism.
Mouffe does not believe that hegemonic critique ought to be conducted solely
outside of existing institutions; rather, she advocates for different modes of intervention,
and some ways of challenging the dominant consensus involve engaging with the existing
institutions. Similarly, she does not believe that artistic activism is the only in which
critical art can exist (Mouffe 2013a, 99). She takes issue with those who claim that artists
should avoid traditional artistic institutions like museums in order to articulate a critique
(Mouffe 2013a, 99). This position is clearly held by the type of radical critique that a
politics of withdrawal would advocate for, and Mouffe wants to challenge the view that
critique of institutions can exist only outside of them. A politics of withdrawal and an
artistic practice based on it does not allow for the possibility of a counter-hegemonic
struggle within the institutions themselves that can disarticulate some constitutive
elements of neo-liberal hegemony (Mouffe 2013a, 99-100). Mouffe argues for a plurality
of efforts in engaging in counter-hegemonic struggle; similarly, she argues for a plurality
of methods for engaging in critical artistic practice. Because of this, Mouffe does not
believe that ‘artivism’ is the only way in which we can engage in aesthetic resistance
(Mouffe 2013a, 99).
Mouffe believes that even institutions like museums can provide agonistic spaces
for resistance, and not every artist that displays their work in a museum is automatically
recuperated by the system. Though museums may serve to perpetuate the culture
industry, they are not created for that purpose, and because of that, we ought not dismiss
the role that they can play in counter-hegemonic resistance against capitalism. Mouffe
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speaks out against those who only recognize institutional achievements as obstacles.
“What is foreclosed,” she writes, “is an immanent critique of institutions, whose
objective is to transform them into a terrain for contesting the hegemonic order” (Mouffe
2013, 100). Mouffe acknowledges that there is always tension within any given
configuration of forces, including those of museums, and it is possible to act in a way to
subvert them (Mouffe 2013, 100). Mouffe argues that “signification is always dependent
on context” and “use determines meaning,” and thus museums can, instead of
constructing bourgeois hegemony, be used for the subversion of capitalist ideology
(Mouffe 2013, 100-101). Museums and institutions do not exist simply to fulfill the
immutable function of perpetuating hegemony. Museums can be envisaged as spaces for
resisting the effects of commercialization on art.
Under post-Fordism, resistance against the culture industry becomes complicated,
as we all perpetuate the culture industry by participating in society. We are required not
only to resist something that is outside ourselves but also to resist something that we
ourselves perpetuate. When we recognize this political dimension of critical practices
(including artistic ones), Mouffe thinks that we will challenge the idea that “to be
political means to offer a radical critique requiring a total break with the existing state of
affairs” (Mouffe 2013, 104). This recognition allows us to shed ourselves of the idea that
all critical gestures will be recuperated into the culture industry, because the gestures
themselves have the power to change the institutions that perpetuate the culture industry.
Similarly, it also allows us to rid ourselves of the thought that to be radical means to be
transgressive, as the changes that we see as a result of critical artistic practices are
precisely the changes in the institutions, and transgressing institutions is not a better way
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than engaging with them to enact change. Mouffe’s agonistics requires engagement with
the key institutions of neoliberalism in order to challenge them, as organizing outside of
dominant structures alone is not enough to confront the way that capitalism perpetuates
itself (Mouffe 2013, 116).
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Chapter IV: Conclusions
In this project, I have looked at Theodor Adorno and Chantal Mouffe’s responses
to the phenomenon of the culture industry, where capitalist modes of production and
economic exchange has seeped into the social world of art and culture. Both theorists are
concerned with the commodification of art and culture and their instrumentalization in
the service of neoliberal capitalism. Adorno and Mouffe respond to the phenomena of
the culture industry in very different ways. In this concluding chapter, I will concern
myself with comparing and contrasting their divergent views on how we ought to resist
the pervasiveness of neoliberal capitalism and what the role of art is in this resistance. I
believe that they both have insights on how to engage with capitalism through artistic
praxis. It is clear that Mouffe and Adorno both see emancipatory potential in art, and
sometimes their views on emancipation may appear similar. For one thing, they both see
art’s potential in being able to show us new possibilities and arrangements that we
otherwise would be blind to under the spell of the culture industry. Adorno’s negative
aesthetics is supposed to show us the possibilities that exist outside of neoliberal
hegemony, and so is Mouffe’s critical artistic praxis. However, what it is that they
consider artistic political praxis is wildly divergent from each other, and each is (in my
reading) critical of the view held by the other.
Part of the reason for the divergence in Mouffe and Adorno’s thinking about how
to engage with the culture industry is Mouffe’s introduction of a changed mode of
production under what she calls post-Fordism (Mouffe 2013b, 208). I understand
Adorno and Horkheimer as still considering a Fordist model of production in their
formulation of the culture industry, and Mouffe expands on that with her work. Both
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theorists agree that the culture industry, under Fordism and post-Fordism, has the power
to perpetuate itself when it is not faced with opposition. The culture industry also has the
power to absorb or co-opt movements that do not fit into the dominant narrative.
However, under post-Fordism, the culture industry take on a different characteristic –
because of the way that labor has changed, oppression under capitalism is no longer as
straightforward as a top-down model would suggest. Rather, those who are victimized
by the culture industry also in turn perpetuate and participate in it (Mouffe 2013b, 209).
I think that this view drastically changes how we can conceive of what it means to resist
in the culture industry, and will contribute to the differences between how Adorno and
Mouffe not only conceive of resistance but also how they conceive of what the political
is.
There are certain fundamental differences between how Adorno and Mouffe
conceive of political space and what it is that makes something political. Adorno is
concerned with the politicization of art, which is the instrumentalization of art for
political ends, and believes that using art for the instrumental end of overthrowing
capitalism is wrong (Adorno 1997, 6). He sees art as being inherently and internally
political, and when art is instrumentalized, it loses its potential for critique (Adorno
1997, 6). The political that Adorno sees in art is a result of the aesthetic negativity that
he sees in works of art that expose the cleavages in the dominant culture (or, to use
Mouffe’s language, the hegemonic narrative). Adorno’s problem with the culture
industry is its reduction of culture to a relationship of exchange and commodification
(Adorno 1997, 227). He sees art as the one thing left in our culture that can be protected
from this instrumentalization. The things that exist within the culture industry are
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necessarily commodified and instrumentalized, even the politics that are supposed to
challenge the existing order. He does not see this challenge as possible when the
challengers themselves are instrumentalizing the forces around them in an effort to fight
capitalism; this seems no different to him than what capitalism aims to do. The aesthetic
negativity that we see in art allows us to see how art can refuse to be co-opted and allow
us to see the possibilities outside of the dominant hegemony.
Mouffe, on the other hand, sees the practices that we engage in as political in
themselves. She is critical of those, like Adorno, who seek to find political space outside
of the dominant hegemony, for she believes that refusing to engage with the hegemony
simply allows the system to perpetuate itself (Mouffe 2013, 116). Indeed, this view
seems to line up even with Adorno and Horkheimer’s view of the culture industry,
where we explore how capitalism perpetuates itself when left on its own. How, then, can
Adorno expect to challenge the culture industry by disengaging from the politicization
of art when the culture industry will simply continue to perpetuate itself when left on its
own? Adorno fears co-option of movements against the culture industry, and that is why
he seeks to find something that can resist this co-option (Adorno et al. 2007, 124).
Mouffe, however, does not share this fear, and I believe this is precisely because of the
introduction of post-Fordism to her conception of the culture industry. Under postFordism, we become participants and agents of the culture industry. It is no longer
enough to withdraw from the culture industry, as withdrawal will still allow the system
of commodification to perpetuate itself – under post-Fordism, we must engage with the
institutions that perpetuate the culture industry in some way or another in order to
change them.
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Adorno is concerned with opposing the capitalist commodification of culture, and
seeks to find in art something that can exist outside of it. Because of this, he becomes
concerned with particular works of art and how they manage to subvert the culture
industry by existing as they are and possessing aesthetic negativity. Initially, it does not
seem to make sense to me that he would be opposing the processes of capitalist
reproduction without directly engaging with counter-processes that can negate capitalist
reproduction. Indeed, this would be one of Mouffe’s biggest criticisms of the way
Adorno conceives of artistic praxis. Though Adorno focuses on the way that capitalism
is produced in his essay on the culture industry, it does not appear that he adequately
considers how the processes of creating art objects can contribute to the struggle against
the culture industry. Mouffe’s argument does allow for the consideration of artistic
processes because she is not solely concerned with art as object but rather with artistic
practices that either articulate or disarticulate an existing hegemony.
An interesting implication of Adorno’s failure to account for the importance of
processes in the creation of art is that he cannot account for the political impact of some
kinds of art, such as performance art, in his conception. In the art of Ai Weiwei, for
example, the production process of each work of art is just as important as the finished
end product, and the process of creation in his work sets itself apart from other processes
of production. Adorno would surely be able to critique Ai Weiwei’s art on the grounds
of aesthetic negativity, but I believe that he would fail to understand the point of the
pieces such as the Name List, which was a list of names of elementary school students
who died in a 2008 earthquake in Sichuan, China.27 This work of art, when presented as
it is, is a list of names of dead children. When the process that went into making it is
27

See: http://aiweiwei.com/projects/5-12-citizens-investigation/remembrance/.
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taken into consideration, when we consider the volunteers that signed up to call the
parents of children to find their names, when we see how the state government tried to
hush up the investigation, we see the political impact of the piece and its value there.
Mouffe’s conception of critical artistic praxis would be able to account for these
processes.
I think the closest Adorno comes to directly tackling capitalist reproductive
processes is in his focus on style as a way to subvert capitalist reproduction (Adorno and
Horkheimer 2002, 99).28 Adorno saw the subversion of style as necessary for opposing
capitalist reproduction because of how capitalism utilized uniformity in style to
commodify art and culture. Because capitalism uses style to inundate the critical
potential of art and to reproduce itself, subverting style then becomes a way of
subverting capitalist influence. Adorno concerning himself with subversion of style in
the culture industry shows that he is not entirely disregarding the role that process plays
in the disarticulation of the culture industry. However, this subversion of style he only
sees as one aspect of resisting the culture industry, and I fail to see how the rest of his
aesthetic theory even comes close to engaging with capitalism the way that he does with
his and Horkheimer’s comment on the critical potential of subverting style.
While Mouffe is concerned with artistic practice as only one avenue of resisting
capitalism, not categorically different than all the other methods, Adorno sees art as
something that can resist with a reason that no other process can possess. I think the
difference here is that for Mouffe, art does not hold a special or privileged cognitive
position that other forms of reason cannot possess. For Mouffe, the advantage that art

28

Actually, I find Mouffe’s view of artistic praxis more in line with Horkheimer and Adorno’s view of the
culture industry.
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has over other forms of resistance is that it appeals to our affects, and that is enough for
art to inspire us to political action. Adorno, on the other hand, sees art as operating in a
separate cognitive realm; one that instrumental reason cannot touch (Adorno 1997, 228).
For Adorno, the value of art is that it touches on a reasoning or a way of seeing
humanity that other forms of reason simply cannot. Mouffe does not discount the
cognitive capability of art, nor its impact on aesthetic resistance, but she does not believe
that the effectiveness of artistic resistance lies there. Mouffe’s agonistic model holds that
the political is affective, and tackling the affective is specifically the role she sees for
artistic practices (Mouffe 2013, 54-55). She certainly does not hold the position that all
art is necessarily affective, but the effectiveness of artistic resistance is in its ability to
move our affects.
If we buy Mouffe’s argument that the political is indeed (at least partly) affective,
then there will be parts of the political that rationality cannot reach. If we see art as
merely a different form of cognitive reasoning from instrumental reason, then it can be
argued the impact that art can potentially have on politics is gravely limited, and we
have fewer reasons for engaging in artistic political praxis. The type of reasoning that
Adorno thinks art engages in, however, is precisely one that utilizes the affect. The
contradiction or negation of art is supposed to stir in us a reason, which, if Menke is
right, Adorno does not see as separable from affect (McCarthy and Menke 1999, viii).
Thus, the reasoning that Adorno sees art engaging in is not at all analogous with
instrumental rationality. This way, the cognitive capability that Adorno sees in art also
tackles the affective nature of the political, and it can do so without instrumentalizing
the art in the same way Mouffe’s artistic practice does. Thus, it is not enough to reject
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Adorno’s conception of artistic praxis simply on the grounds that it requires a different
set of reasoning, and our objections must rest on other grounds.
One problem that Adorno is concerned with is how art, when it is engaging with
politics directly, can be co-opted by the culture industry. He bases his aesthetic theory
on how art can resist this co-option and stay above the fray. Mouffe does not seem to
care if movements are co-opted, as new movements that challenge the dominant
hegemony will emerge. If we are indeed in a post-Fordist age, then every challenge that
emerges, and is then co-opted into the culture industry, has already fundamentally
changed the nature of the culture industry. Adorno would see the movements that are not
resistant to co-option as having been neutralized and made ineffectual. However,
institutions are not static under post-Fordism and society changes along with the things
that change around it. This means that every movement or work of art that becomes coopted by the culture industry, even though that particular work may be absorbed and
commodified, still has the power to impact and change the way that society reproduces
itself. Mouffe is not concerned with co-option because movements that work to change
society actually do. When we choose to disengage from society and withdraw to create
something outside of the existing arrangements, we are relinquishing our ability to
change the arrangements that currently exist. Just because some movements become
neutralized does not mean that we ought to stop strategizing new ways to change the
social relations around us, and when we become concerned with preserving the purity of
whatever project we are engaged in currently (whether it be artistic or political), we lose
sight of the change that we can accomplish with our political work.
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Though I find Mouffe’s conception of artistic political praxis to be more viable
than Adorno’s, taking into consideration the nature of neoliberal capitalism and the
culture industry today, I see some problems with how Mouffe conceives of counterhegemony in her work. Mouffe writes that counter-hegemonic practice requires not only
a disarticulation of existing forces but also a rearticulation of new order (Mouffe 2013b,
213). She provides some examples of how counter-hegemonic practices in art have
successfully done this. I think, however, that Mouffe’s requirement that counterhegemonic practices must necessarily rearticulate some new order conflates two separate
processes that I think would most usefully be kept separated from each other. Under this
strict reading of counter-hegemony, any practice that solely seeks to disrupt or
disarticulate without providing some alternative social order is not truly counterhegemonic. Mouffe appears to conflate the two separable processes of disarticulating
existing hegemonies and the rearticulating new ones. The first is what I think would be
most pertinent to call ‘counter-hegemonic,’ whereas the second is simply the
engagement in a new hegemonic project that should be considered a process separable
from the former.
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